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I have based [the False Claims Act] upon the old-fashioned idea
of holding out a temptation, and “setting a rogue to catch a
rogue,” which is the safest and most expeditious way I have
ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.1

I. Introduction
In describing the concept upon which the forerunner to the
False Claims Act2 was based, Senator Howard, perhaps
unknowingly, pointed out one of the intrinsic issues of all
whistleblower bounty programs: the innate conflict of using a
“rogue” to catch a rogue. There is a necessary threshold
assumption that these programs use informants they perhaps
should not trust to catch cheats they do not trust. And therein lies
the conflict. Whistleblowers provide an invaluable service,
ferreting out fraud where the government simply does not have the
access or ability to do so.3 However, in utilizing such “rogues” to
accomplish this laudable goal, one must also realize the inherent
need to check the possibly roguish nature of whistleblowers that
are incentivized by bounties.
“Imagine getting 10% for blowing the whistle on Madoff’s $50
billion scam. ‘It’s a simple thing that will stop a lot of fraud fast.’”4
Under the new Dodd–Frank5 whistleblower bounty program, that
is exactly what Harry Markopolos, the whistleblower in the Bernie

1. CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 956 (Feb. 14, 1863) (statement of
Senator Howard).
2. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006) (establishing a private right to bring
“a civil action” on behalf of “the person and for the United States Government”
against parties who make fraudulent claims for payment by the government).
3. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating
Incentives for Sarbanes–Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers,
87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 109 (2007) (“Overcoming an internal conspiracy can only
succeed if insiders bring information about ongoing . . . fraud to the attention of
regulators . . . .”).
4. Robert Chew, Calling All Whistleblowers! The SEC Wants You, TIME,
Feb. 24, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/
0,8599,1881318,00.html (quoting Laura Goldman, a whistleblower who has
alerted the SEC to fraud over thirty times).
5. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protections Act, Pub.
Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (establishing comprehensive financial
industry reform).
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Madoff scandal,6 would have been entitled to. In fact, under the
new program, 10% would be the minimum he might collect, with a
possible reward of up to 30%.7 With hundreds of millions, or even
billions of dollars in awards to whistleblowers at play, the
importance of this program is apparent.
This Note’s argument rests on the proposition that in any
whistleblower bounty program three competing interests must be
balanced: (1) those of the employee in reporting wrongdoing,
(2) those of the employer in maximizing efficiency, and (3) those of
society in encouraging the rule of law and accountability.8 This
Note contends that the Dodd–Frank program unfairly misbalances
these interests in a way that gives too little weight to the interests
of the employer.
“Whistleblower” is defined as “[a]n employee who reports
employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement
agency.”9 The virtues of whistleblower programs cannot be
understated. In 2009, whistleblower lawsuits led to the recovery of
nearly $2 billion in frauds against the government.10
Whistleblowers provide inside information about fraud and
corruption that government authorities could otherwise not
reach.11 As such, whistleblowers are an invaluable resource in any
effective fraud-detection scheme.
6. See id. (“[W]histleblowers like Harry Markopolos, the private securities
fraud investigator who dogged Madoff for years and whistled loudly . . . to
others, both inside and outside the agency.”).
7. See infra Part II (explaining the new Dodd–Frank program).
8. Terry Dworkin & Elletta Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting
the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J.
267, 268 (1991) (“Principled policymaking regarding whistleblowing outlets
requires the balancing of competing interests: the employee’s interest in
reporting wrongdoing without penalty, the organization’s interest in maximizing
control and efficiency, and society’s interest in encouraging lawful behavior and
public accountability.”).
9. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009).
10. See Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $2.4
Billion in False Claims Cases in Fiscal Year 2009; More Than $24 Billion Since
1986 (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/
November/09-civ-1253.html (“Of the $2.4 billion in settlements and judgments
obtained in fiscal year 2009, nearly $2 billion was recovered in lawsuits filed
under the False Claims Act’s [whistleblower] provisions.”).
11. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2002)
[hereinafter Bucy, Private Justice] (“No matter how talented or dedicated our
public law enforcement personnel may be nor how many resources our society
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However, whistleblowing, and in particular whistleblower
bounty provisions, are subject to abuse and criticism.12 A
whistleblower “bounty” provision offers the whistleblower an
award for reporting wrongdoing. Often the amount of the award is
set as a percentage of the total recovery that results from the
information.13 This gives whistleblowers an enormous economic
incentive to report violations.14 While this incentive can often serve
to overcome the myriad of negative effects that result from
reporting misconduct (such as retaliation, ostracism, and career
stagnation), it can also lead to severe abuse (such as meritless
reporting in the hopes of a huge payday).15 To combat these
competing issues, any whistleblower bounty program needs to
have certain restrictive policies in place. Essentially, the extreme
economic incentive of the bounty must be tempered by certain
principles of confinement in order to restrict meritless or otherwise
unnecessarily harmful reporting.
To best discover what some of these principles are, this Note
analyzes the Dodd–Frank program in a comparative light with
several other whistleblower bounty programs and predicts how it
will affect businesses. Part II is an overview of the Dodd–Frank
program. It provides an internal view of exactly what the Dodd–
Frank program is and how it will operate.
Part III delves into various other bounty programs. Part III.A
looks at the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) bounty program.
Dodd–Frank was modeled after the IRS program.16 The experience
with that program, therefore, enlightens what the expectations
commits to regulatory efforts, a public regulatory system will always lack the
one resource that is indispensable to effective detection and deterrence of
complex economic wrongdoing: inside information.”).
12. See infra Part III (describing abuse and criticisms in multiple arenas).
13. See infra Part II (stating Dodd–Frank’s bounty as 10%–30% of the total
recovered amount).
14. Cf. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protection for
Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1202–03 (2010) (describing a survey
and experiment on whistleblowers and stating “the level of monetary
compensation offered through the regulatory system is decisive” and “high
rewards were highly influential at the experimental stage”).
15. See infra Part III.B (describing abuses seen under the Federal False
Claims Act).
16. See infra note 60 and accompanying text (reporting that the Dodd–
Frank provision is based on the IRS program).
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under Dodd–Frank should be. Part III.B examines the Federal
False Claims Act. This examination highlights several issues that
are certain to arise under Dodd–Frank, including meritless
reporting, nurturing unlawful conduct, and high transaction costs.
Part III.C explores some state False Claims Acts and discovers
some useful provisions applicable to the Dodd–Frank program.
Part III.D discusses the Sarbanes–Oxley Act17 and its
whistleblower-related provisions along with other state internal
reporting requirements. Although Sarbanes–Oxley does not create
a bounty program, the systems it establishes for internal reporting
of wrongdoing are not only applicable but are absolutely vital to
the proper functioning of the Dodd–Frank program. Finally, Part
IV presents some recommendations that should be included in the
Dodd–Frank program; these are needed to better ensure that all
the “rogues” involved are properly policed and not just the rogues
being chased.
II. The Dodd–Frank Program
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–
Frank).18 Sections 922–24 of Title IX of Dodd–Frank implement a
substantial whistleblower protection and bounty program.19 This
Part details the contours of this new program and draws some
comparisons to the former bounty program it replaces.
Section 922 of Dodd–Frank amends the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)20 by adding section 21F.21 This new
whistleblower bounty program only applies to “covered judicial or
administrative actions,” defined as “any judicial or administrative
17. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (establishing increased disclosure and accounting requirements for
publically held companies).
18. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protections Act, Pub.
Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank].
19. Dodd–Frank § 922–24.
20. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15. U.S.C. 78a et seq. (2006)
(establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission and providing for the
regulation of secondary trading of securities and the regulation of financial
markets and their participants).
21. See Dodd–Frank § 922(a).
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action brought by the Commission under the securities laws that
results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.”22 The
Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission or SEC)
defines “action” as “a single captioned judicial or administrative
proceeding.”23
This approach has two specific implications. First, “action”
includes “all defendants or respondents, and all claims, that are
brought within that proceeding without regard to which specific
defendants or respondents, or which specific claims, were included
in the action as a result of the information that the whistleblower
provided.”24 This means if a whistleblower provided information
about insider trading by a single individual, and the investigation
leads to an action against multiple defendants, all “the sanctions
collected from all the defendants in the action would be added up
to determine whether the $1,000,000 threshold has been met.”25
Second, “action” also means that the “Commission [will] not
aggregate sanctions that are imposed in separate judicial or
administrative actions for purposes of determining whether the
$1,000,000 threshold is satisfied, even if the actions arise out of a
single investigation.”26 Therefore, if a whistleblower provided
information that lead to two separate judicial or administrative
actions, one leading to a $500,000 sanction, and the other leading
to an $800,000 sanction, these amounts would not be aggregated,
and “no whistleblower award would be authorized because no
single action will have obtained sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.”27
22. Id. § 922(a)(1).
23. Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70521
(proposed Nov. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) [hereinafter
SEC, Proposed Rules]; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(d) (2011). At the time of writing,
only the Proposed Rules were available. Some limited citations to, and
comments regarding, the final rules have been made where necessary and
appropriate. In the final rule, the definition of “action” also includes “two or
more administrative or judicial proceedings brought by the Commission if these
proceedings arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts.” 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F–4(d)(1) (2011).
24. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70498.
25. Id. Although the final rule does not mention this analysis, given its
adoption of the “same nucleus of operative facts” test, this analysis should
remain correct.
26. Id.
27. Id. The final rule does give the Commission added discretion in this
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Once the $1,000,000 threshold has been met, the
whistleblower bounty program is triggered. In such an event, the
Commission
shall pay an award or awards to 1 or more whistleblowers who
voluntarily provided original information to the Commission
that led to the successful enforcement of the covered judicial or
administrative action, or related action, in an aggregate amount
equal to—
(A) not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been collected
of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related
actions; and
(B) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or
related actions.28

This portion of the legislation represents what is known as the
“bounty” provision.29 There are several major points of departure
here from the old SEC bounty program worth noting. The previous
bounty provision under the Exchange Act called for “such sums,
not to exceed 10 percent of such amounts, as the Commission
deems appropriate.”30 First, this § 78u program left the payment of
bounties totally at the discretion of the Commission, whereas the
Dodd–Frank program directs that the Commission “shall” pay
such awards.31 Second, the old provision capped all possible
bounties at 10%, whereas the Dodd–Frank program imposes a 10%
mandatory floor, with a possible reward up to a ceiling of 30%.32
Another important difference from the § 78u program is a
right of judicial review. Section 78u states, “Any determinations
under this subsection, including whether, to whom, or in what
regard, allowing aggregation where the proceedings arise out of the “same
nucleus of operative facts.” However, the final rule still states that “[a]n action
generally means a single captioned judicial or administrative proceeding.” 17
C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(d) (2011).
28. Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1).
29. See U.S. ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Elec. Co., 41 F.3d
1032, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing bounties in the False Claims Act and
stating, “If . . . a sum of money is collected from the defendant as a result of the
ensuing action or settlement, the relator is to receive a bounty between 15–25%
of the collected sum (‘the bounty’).”).
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006).
31. Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1).
32. Id.

1208

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201 (2012)

amount to make payments, shall be in the sole discretion of the
Commission . . . . Any such determination shall be final and not
subject to judicial review.”33 Dodd–Frank, however, provides that,
“Any such determination, except the determination of the amount of
an award if the award was made in accordance with subsection (b),
may be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals of the United
States. . . .”34 Therefore, the only non-appealable determination
under Dodd–Frank is a granted award that lies within the 10%–
30% range.35 However, determinations of “whether, [and] to whom,”
to make an award, or awards outside of the 10%–30% range, are
amenable to judicial review under Dodd–Frank.36
The next important substantive change from the § 78u program
is that the Dodd–Frank provision also applies to sanctions and
settlements from “related action[s].”37 This is defined by the statute
as meaning “any judicial or administrative action brought”38 by “the
Attorney General of the United States, an appropriate regulatory
authority, a self-regulatory organization, or a State attorney general
in connection with any criminal investigation,”39 which is “based
upon the [same] original information provided by [the] whistleblower”40 that initially led the Commission to obtain monetary
sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000.41 The § 78u program only

33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006).
34. Dodd–Frank § 922(f).
35. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34347 (June 13, 2011)
[hereinafter SEC, Final Rules] (“[W]hen the Commission makes an award
between 10 and 30 percent . . . our final order regarding the amount of an award
(including the award allocation among multiple whistleblowers) is not
appealable.”).
36. Dodd–Frank § 922(f) (“Any determination made under this section,
including whether, to whom, or in what amount to make awards, shall be in the
discretion of the Commission. Any such determination . . . may be appealed to
the appropriate court of appeals of the United States . . . .”).
37. Id. § 922(a)(5).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 922(h)(2)(D)(i)(I)–(IV).
40. Id. § 922(a)(5).
41. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–3(b)(1) (2011) (“A related action is a judicial or
administrative action that is . . . based on the same original information that the
whistleblower voluntarily provided to the Commission, and that led the
Commission to obtain monetary sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000.”).
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applied to sanctions recovered by “the Commission or the Attorney
General.”42
The next logical question is what are appropriate regulatory
authorities or self-regulatory organizations? These have further
been defined through the SEC rulemaking process.43 The SEC has
defined an appropriate regulatory authority as “the Commission,
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and any other
agencies that may be defined as appropriate regulatory agencies
under Section 3(a)(34) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C.
78c(a)(34)).”44 Self-regulatory organizations include “any national
securities exchange, registered securities association, registered
clearing agency, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and
any other organizations that may be defined as self-regulatory
organizations under Section 3(a)(26) of the Exchange Act (15
U.S.C. 78c(a)(26)).”45
Clearly, the “related action” provision of the Dodd–Frank
program greatly expands the scope of this whistleblower bounty
program. Once the initial $1,000,000 covered action hurdle is
crossed, a putative whistleblower is eligible to receive 10%–30% of
all sanctions recovered from any of the above listed entities.46 This
provision highlights the major expansion that the Dodd–Frank
whistleblower program is over its predecessor.
Aside from the elements that expand upon the old § 78u
program, other statutory language also requires parsing before the
full scope of the new program becomes clear. First of all, Dodd–
Frank section 922(b)(1) states that the bounty will only be paid to

42. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006).
43. See generally SEC, Final Rules, supra note 35 (defining terms
associated with the Dodd–Frank whistleblower program); SEC, Proposed Rules,
supra note 23 (same).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(f) (2011).
45. Id. § 240.21F–4(h).
46. See id. § 240.21F–3(b) (“The Commission will also pay an award based
on amounts collected in certain related actions . . . A related action is a judicial
or administrative action that is . . . based on the same original
information . . . that led the Commission to obtain monetary sanctions totaling
more than $1,000,000.”).

1210

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201 (2012)

a “whistleblower.”47 But what is a whistleblower? The Commission
states:
You are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly with others, you
provide the Commission with information . . . and the
information relates to a possible violation of the Federal
securities laws . . . that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
occur. A whistleblower must be an individual. A company or
another entity is not eligible to be a whistleblower.48

Next, section 922(b)(1) states that the whistleblower must
have “voluntarily provided original information.”49 The
Commission has defined these two terms in a very restrictive way.
The Commission will deem a submission to be “voluntary” if the
whistleblower “provide[s] the Commission with the information
before [the whistleblower] or anyone representing [the
whistleblower] (such as an attorney) receives any request, inquiry,
or demand . . . about a matter to which the information in [the]
submission is relevant.”50 The Commission also states that a
submission will not be considered voluntary if the whistleblower is
“under a pre-existing legal or contractual duty to report the
securities violations that are the subject” of the submission.51
“Original Information” is even more restrictively defined. The
statute states:
The term “original information” means information that—
(A) is derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of a
whistleblower;
(B) is not known to the Commission from any other source,
unless the whistleblower is the original source of the
information; and
(C) is not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a
judicial or administrative hearing, in a governmental report,

47. Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(a)(1) (2011).
49. Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1).
50. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70520. The final rule’s language
on this point remained almost unchanged from the proposed rules. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F–4(a) (2011).
51. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70520. This language also was
nearly unchanged. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(a)(3) (2011).
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hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless
the whistleblower is a source of the information.52

The Commission goes even further by additionally refining what
“independent knowledge or analysis” entails. The Commission will
not consider information to be derived from the whistleblower’s
individual knowledge or analysis:
(i) If you obtained the information through a communication that
was subject to the attorney-client privilege. . . .
(ii) If you obtained the information in connection with the legal
representation of a client on whose behalf you or your employer or
firm are providing services, and you seek to use the information to
make a whistleblower submission for your own benefit. . . .
(iii) In circumstances not covered by paragraphs [](i) or [](ii) of this
section, if you obtained the information because you were:
(A) An officer, director, trustee, or partner of an entity and
another person informed you of allegations of misconduct,
or you learned the information in connection with the
entity’s processes for identifying, reporting, and addressing
possible violations of law;
(B) An employee whose principal duties involve compliance
or internal audit responsibilities, or you were employed by
or otherwise associated with a firm retained to perform
compliance or internal audit functions for an entity;
(C) Employed by or otherwise associated with a firm
retained to conduct an inquiry or investigation into possible
violations of law; or
(D) An employee of, or other person associated with, a
public accounting firm, if you obtained the information
through the performance of an engagement required of an
independent public accountant under the Federal securities
laws . . . .
(iv) If you obtained the information by a means or in a manner that
is determined by a United States court to violate applicable
Federal or state criminal law . . . .
(vi) If you obtained the information from a person who is subject to
this section . . . .53
52. Dodd–Frank § 922(a)(3).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(4) (2011). There are some limited exceptions
to the exclusions in (iii). See generally id. § 240.21F–4(b)(4)(v).
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This restrictive definition of “independent knowledge” and by
proxy “original information” will likely serve to reduce the number
of successful whistleblower bounty claims by limiting the number
of eligible participants.54
The final requirement of section 922(b)(1) is that the
information must have “led to the successful enforcement” of the
covered action.55 The Commission will consider original
information to have “led to” a successful enforcement if the
whistleblower’s submission “was sufficiently specific, credible, and
timely to cause the staff to commence an examination, open an
investigation, reopen an investigation that the Commission had
closed, or to inquire concerning different conduct as part of a
current examination or investigation, and the Commission brought
a successful judicial or administrative action based in whole or in
part on conduct that was the subject of your original
information.”56
The Commission will also consider the whistleblower’s
submission to have passed the “led to” requirement if the
whistleblower “gave the Commission original information about
conduct
that
was
already
under
examination
or
investigation . . . and [the information] significantly contributed to
the success of the action.”57 The Commission has implied that it
intends to interpret this second prong strictly, so that bounty
rewards under it will be rare.58
III. Other Whistleblower Bounty Programs
To determine the likely effects of the Dodd–Frank program, it
is relevant to look at other whistleblower bounty programs and
54. See SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70516 (“[T]he restrictions in
this definition would limit the pool of eligible whistleblowers and thereby reduce
the number of potentially useful informants . . . .”).
55. Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(c)(1) (2011).
57. Id. § 240.21F–4(c)(2).
58. See SEC, Final Rules, supra note 35, at 34325 (“In applying this
standard, among other things, we will look at factors such as whether the
information allowed us to bring: (1) Our successful action in significantly less
time or with significantly fewer resources; (2) additional successful claims; or
(3) successful claims against additional individuals or entities.”).

WHISTLING ROGUES

1213

perform a comparative analysis. From these we can determine
likely bounty amounts, determine the likely level of reporting, and
identify relevant changes that should be implemented into the
Dodd–Frank program. Several similar bounty programs exist both
on the federal and state levels.59 From this analysis we can
ascertain important implementation and administrative policies
that should be incorporated into the Dodd–Frank program.
A. The IRS Bounty Program
The most appropriate starting point for this comparative
analysis is the program upon which the Dodd–Frank program is
based, the Internal Revenue Service’s bounty program.60 The IRS
program was established pursuant to the Tax Relief and
Healthcare Act of 2006.61 Similar to Dodd–Frank and the old § 78u
program for the SEC, the IRS program was established to
strengthen a bounty program that had been in place since 1867,62
but was mostly ineffective.63 The new program was established by
adding subsection (b) to the 140-year-old § 7623 of the Internal
Revenue Code.64 Section 7623(a), similar to the § 78u program,
59. See generally M. Thomas Arnold, “It’s Déjà Vu All Over Again” Using
Bounty Hunters to Leverage Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419 (2010);
Pamela Bucy et al., States, Statutes, and Fraud: A Study of Emerging State
Efforts to Combat White Collar Crime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523 (2010)
[hereinafter Bucy, States].
60. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010) (“The [Dodd–Frank] program is
modeled after a successful IRS Whistleblower Program enacted into law in
2006.”).
61. See Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922, 2958 (2006) (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 7623(b)) (establishing an expanded IRS whistleblower bounty
program).
62. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 7, 14 Stat. 471, 473 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 7623(a)) (providing the commissioner of the IRS with the power to “pay such
sums” as he deems “necessary for detecting and bringing to trial and
punishment” those who violate the internal revenue laws).
63. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX
LAW. 357, 364 (2008) (concluding that the old IRS Informant Reward Program
failed due to “paltry bounties, stingy administrators, inadequate protection for
whistleblowers, and unreceptive courts”).
64. See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, Div.
A, Title IV, § 406(d), 120 Stat. 2922 (2006) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 7623 by
adding new subsection 7623(b)).
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leaves reward amounts to the total discretion of the
Commissioner.65 The § 7623(a) program is still in effect today for
those whistleblower claims that do not qualify for subsection (b)
treatment.66
The Dodd–Frank program is extremely similar to the IRS
Section 7623(b)(1)
provides
that
§ 7623(b)
program.67
whistleblowers shall receive a 15%–30% bounty of the collected
revenues if the Secretary of the IRS proceeds with any
administrative or judicial action based on the information brought
to the Secretary’s attention by the whistleblower.68 Such
information must relate to either the underpayment of taxes or the
bringing to justice of those who have violated the tax laws.69 The
§ 7623(b) program is limited, however. It applies to both
65. See I.R.C. § 7623(a) (2006) (“The Secretary, under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary, is authorized to pay such sums as he deems
necessary for—(1) detecting underpayments of tax . . . .”); see also John R.
Dorocak, State Tax Informants: Rewards and Liabilities Implementation in
California and Guidance From the New and Old Federal Program—Should
They be Paid?, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 279, 282–84 (2008) (stating that the §7623(b)
program takes away IRS discretion “through the ‘shall receive’ language” but
that the §7623(a) arm of the program “leaves the amount of the reward to the
discretion” of the IRS).
66. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(5) (2006) (“This subsection shall apply with respect
to any action—(A) against any taxpayer, but in the case of any individual, only if
such individual’s gross income exceeds $200,000 . . . and (B) if the tax, penalties,
interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in dispute exceed
$2,000,000.”); see also Dorocak, supra note 65, at 282 (“Section 7623(b)(5)
indicates that 7623(b) does not apply . . . unless such individual’s gross income
in any involved year exceeds $200,000 and the amounts in dispute exceed $2
million. . . . Thus, many IRS informants . . . will continue to suffer the problems
of the existing IRS reward [§7623(a)] program.”).
67. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 112 (2010) (using the IRS’s program as a
model, the Senate Banking Committee “determined that enforceability and
relatively predictable level of payout will go a long way to motivate potential
whistleblowers to come forward”).
68. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006) (“If the Secretary proceeds with any
administrative or judicial action . . . based on information brought to the
Secretary’s attention by an individual, such individual shall, subject to
paragraph (2), receive as an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30
percent of the collected proceeds . . . .”).
69. See id. § 7623(a) (“The Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, is authorized to pay such sums as he deems necessary for—(1)
detecting underpayments of tax, or (2) detecting and bringing to trial and
punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or conniving at
the same. . . .”); Id. § 7623(b)(1) (“If the Secretary proceeds with any
administrative or judicial action described in subsection (a) . . . .”).
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corporations and individuals, but in the case of an action against
an individual, such individual’s gross income must exceed
$200,000 for one of the taxable years in dispute.70 Also, for the
program to trigger in any case, the amount in dispute must exceed
$2 million.71 If these requirements are not met the whistleblower
may revert to the § 7623(a) program.72
Whistleblowers who file under § 7623(b) also have a right to
judicial review by the Tax Court of their claims and awards under
this program.73 The appeal, however, must occur within thirty
days of the award determination.74
Because the two programs are so similar, the success of the
§ 7623(b) program is particularly relevant to any inquiry into the
likely effect of the Dodd–Frank program. Since the § 7623(b)
program’s passage in 2006, the IRS has seen a marked increase in
reporting: from 2,751 cases received in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, to
5,678 cases received in FY 2009, an over 100% increase in
reporting over just three years.75 From FY 2007 through FY 2009,
$41,822,569 in whistleblower awards were paid,76 and

70. See id. § 7623(b)(5) (“This subsection shall apply with respect to any
action—(A) against any taxpayer, but in the case of any individual, only if such
individual’s gross income exceeds $200,000 for any taxable year subject to such
action . . . .”).
71. See id. (“This subsection shall apply with respect to any action . . . if the
tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in dispute
exceed $2,000,000.”).
72. See Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower
Program Thanks to the IRC Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 447,
456 (2010) (“The Service whistleblower law as it was before the 2006
amendments continues to exist in section 7623(a). Section 7623(a) applies to
claims that do not meet the section 7623(b) thresholds and to information
submitted before the new law became effective.” (internal citations omitted)).
73. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4) (2006) (“Any determination regarding an award
under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) may, within 30 days of such determination, be
appealed to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with
respect to such matter).”).
74. Id.
75. IRS, FY 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF SECTION 7623
7–8 (2010) [hereinafter IRS, 2009 REPORT], available at www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/whistleblowerfy09rtc.pdf. This report discusses program activities for the
fiscal year 2009, which ended September 30, 2009. Id. at 1. It represents the
most current information available at the time of this writing.
76. Id. at 8.
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$543,802,993 of unpaid taxes were collected.77 The Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration found that in 2008
whistleblower reports alleged $65 billion in underreported
income,78 up from alleged underreporting of $8 billion in 2007, an
increase by a factor of eight.79 It is also worth noting that from
2003 through 2006, there were zero IRS collections of over $2
million through the whistleblower program.80 But in 2007, the first
full year in which the new § 7623(b) program was in effect, there
were twelve collections of over $2 million,81 and there were a total
of thirteen collections over $2 million in 2008 and 2009.82
This data reveals that the § 7623(b) program has led to
increased reporting. However, no awards have been paid out under
it yet due to an IRS policy of waiting until the period for filing an
appeal has lapsed before paying any awards.83 Therefore, the
§ 7623(b) program has not affected the total percentage dollar
amount of the bounties that have been paid to date.84
77.
78.

Id.
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, DEFICIENCIES
EXIST IN THE CONTROL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS 1
(2009), available at www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/00930114
fr.pdf.
79. Id. at 6.
80. See IRS, FY 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF SECTION
7623 6 (2008), available at www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/whistleblower_
annual_report.pdf (reporting whistleblower data from fiscal year 2003 through
2007).
81. Id.
82. IRS, 2009 REPORT, supra note 75, at 9.
83. See id. at 7 (“[T]he Whistleblower Office determined that in cases
where the taxpayer has not filed an appeal, the IRS should not pay the claim
until the period for filing an appeal has lapsed. . . . [U]ntil two years have
passed after the last payment, the case is still subject to . . . appeal.”).
84. See id. (“To date, all awards the IRS has paid have been based on
information received before December 20, 2006, the date of the enactment of
section [7623(b)]. Therefore, all of the awards, including those paid in FY 2009,
were governed by . . . what is now section 7623(a).”). The report goes on to state,
“Thus, the applicable award percentages were those established in prior IRS
policy, not the higher percentages set by the new law.” Id. The most infamous
reporting under the new § 7623(b) program is that of Bradley Birkenfeld, a
former employee of UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank. See Janet Novak &
William P. Barrett, Tax Informants Are On the Loose, FORBES, Dec. 14, 2009, at
104 (reporting the story of Birkenfeld’s whistleblowing). His information about
tax evasion techniques led to a $780 million dollar payment by UBS to the U.S.
government, but also resulted in forty months of jail time for Birkenfeld. See
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Despite the possible pitfalls and slow payments, the § 7623(b)
program has led to increased reporting and will eventually lead to
increased bounty payments. Given the similarity of the § 7623(b)
and Dodd–Frank programs, a similar marked increase in reporting
and payments should be expected under Dodd–Frank.85
B. The Federal False Claims Act86
The IRS program, and therefore implicitly the Dodd–Frank
program, is in many ways modeled after the False Claims Act
(FCA).87 The FCA is an example of a “qui tam” provision, a Latin
term short for, “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac
parte sequitur,” which translates to “who as well for the king as for
himself sues in this matter.”88 In a qui tam action, private citizens
(known as “relators”89) with personal knowledge of wrongdoing
(here, fraud perpetrated against the government) can bring a suit
on behalf of the United States, and in return he or she gets to
share in a significant “cut of the judgment proceeds should they
prevail.”90 Qui tam provisions were quite popular in England at
David S. Hilzenrath, A Swiss Banker’s Saga Offers a Cautionary Tale: For
Spilling Secrets to the Government, You Could be Richly Rewarded or Sent to
Prison. Or Both., WASH. POST, May 16, 2010, at G1 (reporting on Birkenfeld’s
criminal case and imprisonment).
85. See Yin Wilczek, SEC to Take Advantage of New Powers to File Aiding,
Abetting Charges, Official Says, 8 CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (BNA) 1224 (Nov.
12, 2010) (quoting David Rosenfeld, associate director of the SEC’s New York
Regional Office as stating that his office has been “inundated” with tips under
the Dodd–Frank program, and that he “expect[s] tons of these whistleblower
complaints”).
86. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006) (establishing a private right to bring
“a civil action” on behalf of “the person and for the United States Government”
against parties who make fraudulent claims for payment by the government).
87. See Kwon, supra note 72, at 457 (“The 2006 amendments to the IRS
Whistleblower Act in many respects model the 1986 amendments to the federal
False Claims Act.”).
88. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009).
89. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 5C (2010) (“An individual, hereafter
referred to as relator, may bring a civil action in superior court for a violation of
said sections . . . on behalf of the relator and the commonwealth or any political
subdivision thereof.”).
90. U.S. ex rel. Lamers v. Green Bay, 998 F. Supp. 971, 977 (E.D. Wis.
1998), aff’d, 168 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 1999).
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the time of our nation’s founding, and early American Congresses
likewise enacted multiple qui tam statutes.91 Most of these
provisions, however, no longer exist.92
The FCA was originally passed in 1863 in response to fraud
perpetrated on the government during the Civil War.93 It was
commonly referred to as the “Lincoln Law,” and it responded to
reports that, amongst other frauds, the U.S. government was being
sold the same horses multiple times or supplies that were nothing
but boxes of sawdust.94 The essence of a FCA claim is that the
defendant has “knowingly” presented or caused to be presented a
false or fraudulent claim for payment.95
The FCA remained relatively dormant after the Civil War
until the 1930s and 1940s when increased government spending on
New Deal programs and the build up to World War II “opened up
numerous opportunities for unscrupulous government contractors
to defraud the government.”96 Unfortunately, the large cash
91. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication
of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 553 (2002) (“Qui tam enforcement
has never been as widespread in this country as it once was in England. Early
American Congresses continued the English practice by enacting a few qui tam
statutes.”); Id. at 553 n.54 (noting early American qui tam statutes relating to
the collection of duties, regulation of the slave trade, and the employment of
seamen without a contract, amongst others).
92. See id. at 554 (“Most of these passed out of existence long ago, and only
a smattering of qui tam provisions still linger in the United States Code.”).
93. See STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER
LAW 203 (2001) (“The False Claims Act . . . is the major law utilized to ‘feret out
fraud against the federal government.’ It was enacted during the Civil War at
the ‘behest’ of President Abraham Lincoln to ‘control fraud in defense
contracts’ . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
94. See Todd J. Canni, Who’s Making False Claims, The Qui Tam Plaintiff
or the Government Contractor? A Proposal to Amend the FCA to Require that All
Qui Tam Plaintiffs Possess Direct Knowledge, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 4 (2007)
(“[T]he FCA was commonly referred to as ‘the Lincoln Law’ because President
Abraham Lincoln advocated in favor of its passage. . . [S]ome war profiteers had
engaged in . . . shipping boxes of sawdust in place of supplies or by tricking the
Government into purchasing the same horses more than once.” (internal
citations omitted)).
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2006). “Knowingly” is further defined as,
“[H]as actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of
the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of the information; and (B) require no proof of specific intent to
defraud.” Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A), (B).
96. U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boran Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 679
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
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bounties offered by the FCA also provided great incentive for
relators to file “parasitic” suits, actions not based on any personal
knowledge of the relator, but rather consisting solely of
information already known to the government.97 The relator
simply needed to file the action before the government could.98
This abuse led to reform in 1943, when Congress amended the
FCA to deprive courts of jurisdiction when the suit was based on
evidence or information already “in the possession of the United
States, or any agency.”99 The change, however, lead to absurd
results; in one case the state of Wisconsin was unable to pursue a
doctor who had submitted 912 fraudulent claims for
reimbursement from Medicare because, as required by statute, the
State had already disclosed the fraud to the federal government
before filing the suit.100 To make matters worse, the Attorney
General failed to intervene, “leaving no proper plaintiff to pursue
patently fraudulent conduct.”101 Due to this “government
knowledge bar,” the number of qui tam claims brought under the
FCA decreased significantly.102

97. See Beverly Cohen, Trouble at the Source: The Debates Over the Public
Disclosure Provisions of the False Claims Act’s Original Source Rule, 60 MERCER
L. REV. 701, 704 (2009) (“[T]he Act did not require the relators to allege
undiscovered frauds in their qui tam complaints; instead, relators were able to
commence a qui tam lawsuit based completely on information already uncovered
by government investigators. [The Act was] [w]ithout any statutory restrictions
on these ‘parasitic’ lawsuits . . . .” (citations omitted)).
98. See KOHN, supra note 93, at 205 (“In fact, the language of the law
permitted ‘piggy-back law suits’ in which the relator could merely copy a
criminal fraud indictment and rush to the courthouse to beat the government in
filing the FCA claim.”).
99. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608, 609 (1943).
100. See U.S. ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1102, 1104 (7th Cir.
1984) (finding that the State could not pursue the claim because the information
had already been revealed to the federal government).
101. U.S. ex rel. Lamers v. Green Bay, 998 F. Supp. 971, 977 (E.D. Wis.
1998), aff’d, 168 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 1999).
102. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675,
680 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The use of qui tam suits as a weapon for fighting fraud
against the government dramatically declined.”); Cohen, supra note 97, at 706
(“[T]he ‘government knowledge’ standard ultimately frustrated the efforts of
legitimate relators who had acquired knowledge of the fraud on their own but
were required by law to report the fraud. As a result, use of qui tam lawsuits
declined.” (internal citations omitted)).
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With this checkered past in mind, Congress amended the FCA
in 1986 to its current version.103 The 1986 amendments repealed
the government knowledge bar, and courts are only deprived of
jurisdiction if the complaint is based upon allegations or
transactions that were publically disclosed, unless the relator was
the source of the public disclosure.104 Public disclosures include:
federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearings in which the
government is a party; congressional reports, audits, and
investigations; and disclosures “from the news media.”105 To avoid
this “public disclosure bar,” the relator must show that he is an
“original source,” defined as an individual who prior to the public
disclosure “voluntarily disclosed to the Government the
information on which allegations or transactions in a claim are
based,” or “who has knowledge that is independent of and
materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or
transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before filing [the qui tam complaint].”106 Most
commentators state that the relator must have “direct and
independent knowledge” of the allegations on which the claim is
based.107
We see this history, and the incremental changes to the FCA
to remedy it, reflected in Dodd–Frank’s definition of “original
information.”108 Dodd–Frank and the Commission’s rules define
“original information” to exclude information that was “exclusively
derived” from a judicial or administrative hearing, in a
governmental report, or from “the news media,”109 unless “the

103. See False Claims Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986)
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006)) (amending the False
Claims Act).
104. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2006) (“The court shall dismiss an action or
claim under this section . . . if substantially the same allegations or transactions
as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed . . . unless . . . the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information.”).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
107. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 93, at 208 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B));
Cohen, supra note 97, at 709.
108. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (quoting the full definition of
“original information”).
109. Dodd–Frank § 922(a)(3)(C); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b) (2011).
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whistleblower is a source of the information.”110 This is nearly a
direct parroting of the FCA’s “public disclosure bar” discussed
above111 and illustrates Dodd–Frank’s parallels to and awareness
of issues faced by the FCA in the past.
Although private citizens bring these qui tam FCA claims, a
claim must be filed “in the name of the [United States]
Government.”112 A copy of the complaint along with a “disclosure of
substantially all material evidence” must then be served on the
government.113 The complaint is filed in camera and under seal for
sixty days.114 The complaint is not served on the defendant “until
the court so orders.”115 During those sixty days, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) “may elect” to intervene in the suit.116 However, the
DOJ may “for good cause” move for an extension of the sixty-day
intervention period, and this may be done an indefinite number of
times.117 Most importantly, even if the DOJ decides not to
intervene, the relator can still go forward with the suit.118
If the DOJ does intervene, its primacy is indisputable.119 In
fact, the DOJ can dismiss the case over the objection of the
relator.120 This power, however, is rarely used.121 Further, the
110. Dodd–Frank § 922(a)(3)(B).
111. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (discussing the FCA’s
“public disclosure bar”).
112. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006).
113. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. § 3730(b)(3); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem
with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 287 (2007) (“The Government may request an
indefinite number of continuances while it considers and reviews the case at
issue.”).
118. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (2006) (“Before the expiration of the 60-day
period . . . the Government shall—(A) proceed with the action . . . or (B) notify
the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case the person
bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action.”).
119. See id. § 3730(c)(1) (“If the Government proceeds with the action, it
shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be
bound by an act of the person bringing the action.”).
120. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (“The Government may dismiss the action
notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action.”).
121. See Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the
Department of Justice to Rein In Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the
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Attorney General may also settle the claim over the objection of
the relator if the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.”122
A relator’s participation in the case can also be greatly restricted if
the DOJ shows that the relator’s involvement would “interfere
with or unduly delay the Government’s prosecution of the case.”123
Even where the DOJ decides not to intervene, the FCA gives the
DOJ substantial supervisory powers such as the right to be served
with all pleadings, transcripts of all depositions,124 and the ability
to stay discovery.125 The DOJ can also preempt the relator’s claim
by pursuing it through alternative means.126 Finally, upon a
Civil False Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2008) (“However, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) exercises its check only occasionally, intervening
in less than a quarter of the qui tam actions filed and moving to dismiss
sparingly.”).
122. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (2006) (“The Government may settle the
action with the defendant notwithstanding the objections of the person
initiating the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.”).
123. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(C), (D) (stating certain limitations that may be
imposed). The statute states:
Upon a showing by the Government that unrestricted participation
during the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action
would interfere with or unduly delay the Government’s prosecution of
the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of
harassment, the court may, in its discretion, impose limitations on
the person’s participation, such as–
(i) limiting the number of witnesses the person may call;
(ii) limiting the length of the testimony of such witnesses;
(iii) limiting the person’s cross-examination of witnesses; or
(iv) otherwise limiting the participation by the person in the
litigation.
(D) Upon a showing by the defendant that unrestricted participation
during the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action
would be for purposes of harassment or would cause the defendant
undue burden or unnecessary expense, the court may limit the
participation by the person in the litigation.
Id.
124. See id. § 3730(c)(3) (“If the Government so requests, it shall be served
with copies of all pleadings filed in the action and shall be supplied with copies
of all deposition transcripts (at the Government’s expense).”).
125. See id. § 3730(c)(4) (“[U]pon a showing by the Government . . . the court
may stay such discovery for a period of not more than 60 days.”).
126. See id. § 3730(c)(5) (“Notwithstanding subsection (b), the Government
may elect to pursue its claim through any alternate remedy available to the
Government, including any administrative proceeding to determine a civil
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showing of good cause, the DOJ may choose to intervene at a later
date.127
The 1986 FCA amendments also increased the penalties under
the Act to between $5,500–$11,000 per false claim, plus three
times the amount of damages sustained by the government due to
the defendant’s fraudulent act.128 The FCA defines “claim” as “any
request or demand . . . for money or property.”129 This means, for
example, that each false request for payment submitted by a
doctor will be considered a separate claim, amenable to separate
$5,500–$11,000 penalties.130 Then, any monetary damages
resulting from the fraudulent claims that are inflicted on the
government are trebled.131 Therefore, potential recoveries,
especially in the medical arena, can quickly escalate into the “tens
or hundreds of millions of dollars.”132
Assuming that the public disclosure bar and all other hurdles
are passed, the relator then takes his or her share of the
money penalty.”).
127. See id. § 3730(c)(3) (“When a person proceeds with the action, the court,
without limiting the status and rights of the person initiating the action, may
nevertheless permit the Government to intervene at a later date upon a showing
of good cause.”).
128. See id. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (“[A] civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not
more than $10,000 . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of that person.”); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9)
(2012) (raising the mandatory FCA penalty “minimum from $5,000 to $5,500;
maximum from $10,000 to $11,000”).
129. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A) (2006).
130. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5274 (“Each separate bill, voucher or other ‘false payment demand’
constitutes a separate claim for which a forfeiture shall be imposed, . . . and this
is true although many such claims may be submitted to the Government at one
time.” (internal citations omitted)). The report continues, “For example, a doctor
who completes separate Medicare claims for each patient treated will be liable
for a forfeiture for each such form that contains false entries even though
several such forms may be submitted to the fiscal intermediary at one time.” Id.
131. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2006) (“[A] civil penalty of not less than
$5,000 and not more than $10,000 . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages
which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.”).
132. Rich, supra note 121, at 1248; see also U.S. ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup
Ill., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d. 719, 740–42 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (assessing separate FCA
penalties for each false enrollment form completed by defendant for each of
18,130 patients, even though the intermediary submitted only twenty-four
claims to the government resulting from the forms, for a total FCA penalty of
nearly $100 million).
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damages.133 The relator is entitled to not less than 15% and not
more than 25% of the proceeds from any settlement or judgment in
which the DOJ intervenes.134 Where the DOJ fails to intervene, the
relator is entitled to “not less than 25[%] and not more than 30[%]
of the proceeds of the action or settlement.”135 In either event, the
relator is also entitled to recover “an amount for reasonable
expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred,
plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.”136
There are some compensation limitations in the statute as
well. If the court finds that the relator “planned and initiated” the
violation on which the action is brought, the court may “to the
extent [it] considers appropriate” reduce the relator’s share below
the 15% or 25% minimums.137 Further, if the relator is convicted of
criminal conduct arising from the underlying violation, the relator
is dismissed from the case and is entitled to receive no
compensation.138
Finally, the FCA also has one seemingly strong provision that
should disincentivize meritless suits: if the relator’s claim is not
133. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (describing the public
disclosure bar).
134. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2006) (“If the Government proceeds with an
action brought by a person under subsection (b), such person shall . . . receive at
least 15[%] but not more than 25[%] of the proceeds of the action or settlement
of the claim . . . .”). The award can be reduced below the 15% minimum in
certain public disclosure situations. Id. The statute states:
Where the action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on
disclosures of specific information (other than information provided
by the person bringing the action) relating to allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office
report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the
court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no
case more than 10 percent of the proceeds, taking into account the
significance of the information and the role of the person bringing the
action in advancing the case to litigation.
Id.
135. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
136. Id. § 3730(d)(1), (d)(2).
137. Id. § 3730(d)(3).
138. See. id. (“If the person bringing the action is convicted of criminal
conduct arising from his or her role in the violation of section 3729, that person
shall be dismissed from the civil action and shall not receive any share of the
proceeds of the action.”).
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joined by the DOJ and the defendant is successful in defending
against the suit, the court “may award to the defendant its
reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses” if it finds that the suit
was “clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for
purposes of harassment.”139 Despite this clear indication from
Congress, reverse-attorney’s fees awards are rarely granted under
this provision.140
From one point of view, the FCA, with its qui tam element,
has been a resounding success.141 Since 1987, the year after its
reinvigoration, claims under the FCA have resulted in the recovery
of over $27 billion.142 Over that period, the relators’ share of the
recoveries has been nearly $3 billion.143
Recent examples of the FCA’s efficacy include the story of
Cheryl Eckard.144 She blew the whistle on GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)
over faulty drug manufacturing in the company’s Puerto Rico
139. Id. § 3730(d)(4); see also S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 29 (1986) reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5294 (“The Committee added this language in order to
create a strong disincentive and send a clear message to those who might
consider using the private enforcement provision of this Act for illegitimate
purposes.”). The report continues, “The Committee encourages courts to strictly
apply this provision in frivolous or harassment suits as well as any applicable
sanctions available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id.
140. See, e.g., Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1006–07 (9th Cir.
2002) (“The award of fees under the False Claims Act is reserved for rare and
special circumstances.”).
141. See Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 11, at 58 (“The qui tam private
justice model, by comparison, has proven to be highly effective in recruiting
legal talent . . . . Because of the large recoveries available to private plaintiffs
under the FCA[,] . . . plaintiffs’ counsel can receive large fees . . . .” (citation
omitted)). The article continues, “These large fees are a significant incentive for
top legal talent to undertake qui tam plaintiffs’ work.” Id. In addition, “the qui
tam FCA ‘common good’ private justice action is extremely successful in
bringing forth helpful inside information.” Id. at 61.
142. See CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS—OVERVIEW 2
(Nov. 23, 2010) [hereinafter FRAUD STATISTICS, 2010], available at
www.taf.org/FCA-stats-2010.pdf (reporting $27,195,570,308 in total settlements
and judgments for both qui tam and non-qui tam actions under the FCA).
143. See id. (reporting $2,877,694,871 as the relator share of awards).
144. See Lisa Flam, Ex-Worker Wins $96M for Blowing Whistle on Drug
Giant, AOLNEWS.COM (Oct. 27, 2010, 12:50 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/
10/27/ex-worker-wins-96m-for-blowing-whistle-on-drug-giant/ (last visited Apr.
10, 2012) (reporting on a recent whistleblower who reported under the False
Claims Act against GlaxoSmithKine) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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plant.145 The claim resulted in a $750 million penalty against GSK
and a $96 million award for Eckard, believed to be the singlebiggest whistleblower bounty ever in the United States.146 Further,
is the story of John Kophinski, a former sales representative for
Pfizer, whose reporting lead to a $50 million dollar bounty for
himself and $2.3 billion in payments by Pfizer for illegal drug
marketing.147
Despite these examples of the extreme good that can come
from FCA qui tam litigation, the academic and statistical record is
replete with examples of its utter misuse through expanded
liability, meritless claims, and increased transaction costs.148
1. Non-Meritorious Claims
The key issue here, as it relates to Dodd–Frank, is the amount
of non-meritorious claims filed by qui tam plaintiffs under the
FCA, as this will likely reflect a similar amount of meritless
reporting to be expected under the Dodd–Frank program. This
145. See id. (“She found that the . . . facility had a contaminated water
system, an air system that allowed products to be cross-contaminated and pills
of different strengths mixed in the same bottles . . . .”).
146. See id. (“Her lawyers, Neil Getnick and Leslie Ann Skillen, believe her
share is the single-biggest whistle-blower award in the U.S. . . .”); see also Press
Release, Getnick & Getnick, GlaxoSmithKiline Pays $750 Million For Fraud On
Medicaid
(Oct.
26,
2010),
available
at
http://www.taf.org/EckardGetick&Getnick-PR.pdf (stating that GSK was required to pay $600 million to
settle the civil claims and a $150 million criminal penalty).
147. See Gardiner Harris, Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion to Settle Inquiry Over
Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at B4 (stating that Kopchinski received
more than $50 million for his role in the case and that a total of $102 million in
bounties was paid to informants).
148. See, e.g., Bucy, States, supra note 59, at 1533 (“In short, despite its
enormous success as a regulatory tool, the federal False Claims Act, because of
its unique private-public partnership, creates tensions and costs for law
enforcement, the courts, and businesses.”); Rich, supra note 121, at 1234 (“94%
of qui tam FCA suits that the DOJ has allowed to proceed (totaling more than
3,000 actions) have been dismissed without recovering any funds. These nonmeritorious suits have exacted a heavy toll on defendants, the judicial system,
and the public as a whole.”). See generally Canni, supra note 94; Christina
Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical
Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949 (2007); Justin P. Tschoepe, Comment, A Fraud
Against One Is Apparently a Fraud Against All: The Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act’s Unprecedented Expansion of Liability Under the False Claims
Act, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 741 (2010).
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follows because both programs function as whistleblower bounty
provisions, and both have a similar percentage of recovery
incentive structure.149 It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that
meritless claims filed under the FCA are a reasonable guidepost to
expected non-meritorious reporting under the Dodd–Frank
program.
The DOJ breaks down qui tam statistics into three categories:
“active,” “settlement or judgment,” and “dismissed.”150 This Note
takes the position that dismissed cases were non-meritorious
claims. That position is based on the premise that meritorious
claims would have been settled or proceeded to judgment, even if
the judgment went against the relator. Although many argue that
a significant amount of cases that settle also lack substantial
merit,151 this Note views settlements in the light most favorable to
relators. Dismissed cases, however, either were meritless and
therefore did not warrant adjudication on the merits, or were
somehow technically deficient.152 The former explanation seems
149. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (stating that FCA
relators are entitled to between 15%–30% of recovered proceeds); supra note 28
and accompanying text (stating that whistleblowers under the Dodd–Frank
program are entitled to between 10%–30% of recovered funds).
150. FRAUD STATISTICS, 2010, supra note 142, at 9.
151. See Beck, supra note 91, at 624–25 (“[I]t may be rational for an
informer to pursue a claim, even if it seems unlikely to yield a victory on the
merits. For instance, the case could prove to have a nuisance value, causing the
defendant to settle to avoid the higher costs of defending a fraud claim.”). Cf.
Denise N. Martin et al., Recent Trends IV: What Explains Filings and
Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 125
(1999) (“The merits of most of these lawsuits . . . seem to be of relatively little, if
any, importance in determining the amount of settlement.”).
152. See Broderick, supra note 148, at 972 (“[T]here are two primary reasons
for dismissing a suit: Either it lacks merit or it is deficient on some technical
ground.”). Another possible explanation for both dismissals, and the high
dismissal rates in these qui tam actions, is voluntary dismissal after the
government declines to intervene. Professor Bucy notes, “Historically, relators
who proceed on their own after the DOJ has declined to intervene as a plaintiff
have enjoyed little success. . . . The litigational advantages to private plaintiffs
of obtaining DOJ intervention are so substantial that the acknowledged goal of
any experienced relators’ attorney is to obtain the government’s intervention.”
Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 11, at 51. Because the Government intervenes
in only 22% of qui tam actions, this is a plausible explanation. FRAUD
STATISTICS, 2010, supra note 142, at 9. But see Rich, supra note 121, at 1264
(“[A] senior DOJ official acknowledged in remarks to a conference of health care
lawyers that the merit of many non-intervened cases ‘has been questionable at
best.’” (quoting Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks to
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more likely in the FCA context for a host of reasons. First, the FCA
statute mandates that the relators’ complaint and all material
information be filed with the Attorney General before it is served
on the defendant.153 This gives the DOJ an opportunity to review
the complaint for any technical noncompliance, and rectify any
errors.154 Second, since the 1986 amendments, a considerable “qui
tam bar” has developed.155 These lawyers specialize in FCA
litigation and devote considerable resources towards FCA claims;
the American Health Lawyers Association Meeting (Sept. 30, 2002))). It is the
opinion of this author that although some of these cases are being voluntarily
dismissed, the extreme financial incentives provided by the Act lead the vast
majority of cases to be dismissed non-voluntarily, and therefore the dismissal
rates do reflect their non-meritorious nature. See Matthew, supra note 117, at
293 (“Awards to plaintiffs of between $1 million and $10 million are announced
regularly.”). Further, although the Government may dismiss any claim in which
it has intervened over the objection of the relator per § 3730(c)(2)(A), that power
is rarely used, despite a flood of articles calling for such action. See, e.g., Rich,
supra note 121, at 1264–65 (“The result is that the government does not
dismiss, and relators are permitted to proceed with, thousands of nonmeritorious qui tam suits.”); Matthew, supra note 117, at 285 (“The
Government’s abdication of authority under the FCA results in over-prosecution
and a harmful reduction in the Government’s exercise of caution in the selection
and pursuit of these cases.”). Finally, as discussed supra, the reverse attorney’s
fees provided for under the statute are rarely granted; therefore, there is little
incentive to voluntarily dismiss a possibly lucrative case. See supra note 140
and accompanying text (discussing the rarity with which reverse attorney’s fees
are awarded).
153. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2006) (“A copy of the complaint and written
disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person
possesses shall be served on the Government[,] . . . shall remain under seal for
at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so
orders.”).
154. See Broderick, supra note 148, at 973 (“During this review, the
Attorney General has the opportunity to correct any technical errors in the
complaint. According to Michael Bassham, Tennessee Assistant Attorney
General, it is common for state attorneys general to correct such errors at this
stage.”); supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the Government’s
ability to move for an indefinite number of continuances when deciding whether
to intervene); see also Canni, supra note 94, at 2 (“[I]t is not uncommon for
courts to grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaints multiple times . . . .”).
155. The term “qui tam bar” refers to a set of attorneys or law firms that
work predominantly on qui tam cases, it is a subset of the “plaintiff’s bar.” See,
e.g., A. Craig Eddy, The Effect of the Health Insurance Profitability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on Health Care Fraud in Montana, 61 MONT.
L. REV. 175, 203 (2000) (“[T]he predominant target of qui tam actions recently
shifted from defense contractors to health care providers and the plaintiff’s qui
tam bar is growing rapidly.”).
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their presence further undermines the idea that a substantial
number of these claims are being dismissed due to technical
defects.156 Finally, there is a general public policy in the law that
cases be decided on the merits.157 Because of these reasons,
dismissed qui tam claims are treated herein as presumptively
meritless.
As of 2010, the DOJ’s Fraud Statistics show that 74.4% of all
qui tam actions filed under the FCA were dismissed without a
settlement or judgment.158 Even more concerning, 94% of cases in
which the Government did not intervene were dismissed.159 It is
156. See Beck, supra note 91, at 624 n.441 (“The FCA has spurred the
growth of a ‘qui tam bar’ consisting of law firms that devote substantial
resources to FCA litigation.”); ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
FRAUD AND ABUSE § 6:12 (2011) (“The so-called ‘Qui Tam’ bar has attracted
former federal and state prosecutors, employment lawyers, class action lawyers
and other lawyers skilled in complex, multi-district, high stakes civil
litigation. . . . The sophistication and training of the bar has led to bigger and
larger cases being brought, litigated and ultimately settled.”).
157. See Quinonez v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824, 826–27
(5th Cir. 1976) (restating the “universal rule” that motions to dismiss should
rarely be granted (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957));
Muncaster v. Baptist, 367 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (“[T]he granting
of motions to dismiss . . . is not favored.”); Carss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 252
F.2d 690, 691 (5th Cir. 1958) (“‘[C]ases are generally to be tried on the proofs
rather than the pleadings.’” (quoting Des Isles v. Evans, 200 F.2d 614, 616 (5th
Cir. 1952))). Contra Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
(overturning Conley’s “no set of facts” standard and announcing a “plausibility”
pleading standard); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (applying the
Twombly “plausibility” pleading standard). But see Patricia W. Hatamyar, The
Toa of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
553, 587 n.209 (2010) (“In addition, claims other than common law fraud that
allege some sort of underlying deception, such as securities fraud, RICO, and
qui tam actions under the False Claims Act, must also be pled with
particularity. Such cases are not governed by Twombly and Iqbal . . . .”); William
M. Janssen, Iqbal “Plausibility” in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device
Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 543, 587 (2011) (finding that Iqbal “plausibility”
pleading was not a factor in 80% of the pharmaceutical and medical device
dismissals studied, some of which involved False Claims Act claims). In any
event, the underlying effect of the Twombly–Iqbal line of cases is likely marginal
as those were not decided until 2007 and 2009 respectively, and the FCA
dismissal data covers from 1987 to the present. See FRAUD STATISTICS, 2010,
supra note 142, at 9 (covering 1987–2010).
158. See FRAUD STATISTICS, 2010, supra note 142, at 9 (reporting that of the
5,404 total qui tam actions which had been resolved (i.e., those cases not “under
investigation” or “active”) 4,022 of them were dismissed).
159. See id. (reporting that 3,962 of the 4,628 non-intervened cases were
dismissed, with 412 cases still active). I arrived at this statistic by subtracting
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important to note that although in the late 1980s and early 1990s
qui tam claims were significantly outpaced by government
instituted (non-qui tam) claims,160 since the year 2000 qui tam
claims account for 78.5% of all claims instituted under the FCA.161
To summarize, nearly 75% of all qui tam actions are dismissed
without an award, and qui tam claims account for nearly 80% of
the FCA actions brought since the year 2000.162
These are truly startling statistics. Further, one must keep in
mind that in FCA qui tam actions the relator is charged with doing
much more than simply reporting on wrongdoing; these
whistleblowers are required to file a complaint with a court163 and
hire a lawyer.164 This is a much higher burden than Dodd–Frank
will require, where all the potential whistleblower is required to do
is simply submit the information to an online collection system or
fill out a form and mail or fax it to the SEC Whistleblower
Office.165
the number of active cases from the total, then dividing the number of nonintervened dismissed actions by that total, which resulted in a statistic of
93.975%. This approach appears to be the same as that used by Professor Rich
in his Article cited supra note 121.
160. See FRAUD STATISTICS, 2010, supra note 142, at 1 (reporting that from
1987–1994 non-qui tam claims accounted for 73% of all FCA claims).
161. Id. at 2.
162. Over the entire span since 1987, qui tam claims account for 63.4% of all
FCA claims. Id. Unfortunately the DOJ does not break down dismissal rates by
year, but rather only provide statistics relating to all qui tam actions since 1987.
Id. at 9. This is why dismissal rates over the relevant periods discussed above
are not provided.
163. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), (b)(2) (2006) (stating that the complaint shall
be filed with the court in camera).
164. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Mergent Sers. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir.
2008) (“Because relators lack a personal interest in False Claims Act qui tam
actions, we conclude that they are not entitled to proceed pro se.”); Timson v.
Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district court did not err in
dismissing Timson’s complaint because Timson could not maintain a qui tam
suit under the FCA as a pro se relator.”); U.S. ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 237 F. App’x 802, 803 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A lay person may not bring a qui
tam action under the False Claims Act. Although a qui tam relator is entitled by
statute to a share of the recovery if his action is successful, the United States is
the real party in interest . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
165. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–9(a) (2011) (“[Y]ou must submit your information
about a possible securities law violation by either of these methods: (1) Online,
through the Commission’s Web site located at http://www.sec.gov; or (2) By
mailing or faxing a Form TCR . . . to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower . . . .”).
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It does not, therefore, take a substantial leap of logic to infer
that, as reflected in the qui tam dismissal data, somewhere
between 75%–94% of reports submitted under the Dodd–Frank
program will be non-meritorious. In fact, because simple
submission of a report of wrongdoing is more akin to those qui tam
claims in which the government does not intervene, the 94% figure
may be the more likely result.166
2. Inherent Issues
Although many of the problems that commentators typically
lament about the FCA will not be present under the Dodd–Frank
program because it is not a qui tam program,167 some problems
remain quite important, as they likely will apply in the Dodd–
Frank arena as well.

166. This conclusion is based on the idea that in non-intervened cases the
relator is functioning independently of the government. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(c)(3) (2006) (“If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the
person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action.”). This
is similar to what Dodd–Frank whistleblowers will be doing when submitting
their initial information.
167. There are several consistently decried FCA issues unlikely to apply in
the Dodd–Frank context: First, broad piecemeal expansion of liability driven by
relator’s novel legal theories. See Rich, supra note 121, at 1236–37 (“[N]onintervened qui tam suits that do result in recovery present a different problem:
the haphazard expansion of FCA liability without any guarantee that new
theories of liability will work to the public’s benefit.”). Second, the prevention of
companies from contracting with the government. See William E. Kovacic, The
Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in Government
Procurement Markets, 6. SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 223–35 (1998) (discussing a
survey of forty government contractors, which found that increased compliance
costs and huge potential liability were threats to continued operation in
government contracting). Lastly, because FCA liability can be predicated on
“technical” violations of government regulations, and relators can still recover
the minimum $5,500 per “false” claim plus treble any damages, some
commentators claim relators’ interests are at odds with the Government’s. See
id. at 223 (“Where relators challenge behavior that involves no injury to the
public, and where the fact of a challenge itself may be counterproductive, the
‘relator’s interests and the Government’s do not necessarily coincide.’” (citing
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 n.5 (1997)));
Beck, supra note 91, at 630–31 (“Any failure to comply with the vast array of
federal regulations governing procurement might be the basis of a qui tam
complaint.”).
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The most notable of these inherent issues is the intrinsic
conflict of interest between the relator’s (or whistleblower’s)
interests and those of the government or public.168 This
phenomenon can be termed “nurturing unlawful conduct,”169 and it
results from the fact that in whistleblower bounty situations, such
as the FCA, IRS, and Dodd–Frank programs, the whistleblower’s
compensation is tied directly to the amount of damages or
unlawful conduct present.170 Therefore, putative whistleblowers
have an incentive to allow damages to build up, thereby increasing
the total amount of damages from which their compensation
percentage will be based.171 The Sixth Circuit faced just such a
situation in a case where the FCA relator first contacted his
attorneys in 1987 when damages were at $13.1 million but delayed
filing suit until the damages against the government had more
than tripled to $41.6 million, meaning the relator’s bounty had
more than tripled as well.172
168. See Beck, supra note 91, at 633 (“The public adopts a regulatory
command because it wants the proscribed behavior to decrease. On the other
hand, the informer makes a living from the illegal conduct, and, therefore, the
informer’s interests are advanced by an increase in the number and severity of
statutory violations.” (internal citations omitted)).
169. Id.
170. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1), (d)(2) (2006) (stating a bounty of 15%–30%
under the FCA); I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006) (establishing a 15%–30% bounty for
IRS collections over $2 million); Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1) (establishing a 10%–
30% bounty for all SEC collections over $1 million).
171. See Beck, supra note 91, at 633 (“[T]he informer makes a living from
the illegal conduct, and, therefore, the informer’s interests are advanced by an
increase in the number and severity of statutory violations.”); Id. at 635 (“The
informer, however, is paid based on the amount of fraud he proves. Thus . . . it is
in the informer’s financial interest for the government to be damaged to the
greatest extent possible before the scheme is brought to light.”). Cf. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 661 (7th ed. 2007) (“The incentive for
waiting would be to obtain greater compensation, since the penalty for the
completed crime would be heavier than the penalty for the attempt.”). Judge
Posner also notes a possible “supply” conflict of interest in private enforcement
situations, he notes, “The private enforcer would presumably be paid per
offender convicted . . . . There are several ways in which the enforcer could
increase his ‘catch,’ and hence his income . . . . He could fabricate an offense . . .
or encourage an individual to commit an offense that he would not have
committed without encouragement . . . .” Id.
172. See U.S. ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Elec. Co., 41 F.3d
1032, 1037–39 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the relator contacted his attorneys in
mid-1987 but did not file suit until 1990, after substantial damages had
compiled). The court remanded the case to determine whether the relator was
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The rules promulgated by the SEC for the Dodd–Frank
program only obliquely reference this inherent issue of
unnecessary delay. The only mention of it is in the comments to
the rule defining “independent knowledge,” and it simply relates to
allowing certain persons with oversight and governance
responsibilities (who would be excluded from the definition of
independent knowledge) to make a claim if the company acted in
bad faith in not reporting or remedying the violation.173 This is a
major oversight; the SEC should promulgate rules substantially
reducing the whistleblower’s share if purposeful delay is found.
This recommendation is explained further infra Part IV.B.
The next inherent issue is the increased transaction costs for
both regulated entities and the government. The experience with
the FCA is illustrative of this issue. A senior DOJ official testified
before a Congressional committee that between 1987 and 1992 the
Civil Division spent “20,000 hours investigating . . . 150 qui tam
cases that were [later] dismissed by the courts or not pursued after
we declined to intervene.”174 And this figure does not account for
additional time expended by Assistant U.S. Attorneys or other
government officials such as the Defense Contract Audit Agency
and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.175 While the
relator or whistleblower that submits such a meritless claim loses
little, the government and the public must foot the bill.176
“running up costs.” Id. at 1044.
173. See SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70494 (“[I]f the entity did
not disclose the information to the Commission within a reasonable time or
proceeded in bad faith, these exclusions would no longer apply, thereby making
an individual who knows this undisclosed information eligible to become a
whistleblower by providing ‘independent knowledge’ of the violations.”); 17
C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(v) (2011) (listing exceptions to the exclusions from
“independent knowledge”).
174. False Claims Act Technical Amendments of 1992: Hearing on H.R. 4563
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 25 (1992) (Sup. Docs. No. Y4.J89/1:102/49)
(statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
Department of Justice) [hereinafter Gerson Testimony].
175. See id. at 25–26 (“Assistant U.S. Attorneys spent additional,
unrecorded time on these matters.”); Beck, supra note 91, at 627 (“[T]his total
did not include time spent by other government investigators, such as
employees of the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations.”).
176. See Beck, supra note 91, at 627 (“If the government finds evidence of
fraud, the informer can claim a share of the recovery. If not, the investigation
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This inherent issue highlights the need for the SEC to further
disincentivize meritless reporting under the Dodd–Frank
program.177 This is especially true with Dodd–Frank where the
SEC is likely to receive thousands of reports,178 whereas here the
DOJ was only dealing with 150 meritless claims and still resulted
in significant labor outlays by the Department.179 Because the
Dodd–Frank program’s incentives are likely to cause the SEC to be
overrun with claims,180 limiting the amount of meritless claims is
in the SEC’s own interest.181

has cost the informer little. The costs of a government investigation matter a
great deal to the public, however, because tax dollars pay the salaries of law
enforcement personnel.”).
177. See Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 413 (2010) (“Bounties may also
increase demands on regulatory staff, who not only have to sift through
informants’ tips, but also may have to determine just how much a piece of
information is worth . . . .”); infra Part IV (proposing new rules to disincentivize
meritless reporting).
178. See supra Part III.A (discussing the IRS bounty program and
prognosticating a similar, if not increased, amount of reporting under Dodd–
Frank); see also Sue Reisinger, Firms Face a Sudden Rush of Whistleblower
Claims, CORPORATE COUNSEL, Sept. 9, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/
jsp/article.jsp?id=1202471768561 (“The new federal whistleblower law is
proving a hot item for many plaintiff law firms. Attorneys say that tipsters with
visions of becoming millionaires are flooding their offices with calls.”).
179. Although the Attorney General is required by statute to
“diligently . . . investigate” all claims under the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), and no
similar duty is required of the SEC by Dodd–Frank, it seems quite likely that
significant effort will have to be expended in investigating claims submitted to
the SEC Whistleblower Office. Therefore, these statistics, while not perfectly
analogous, do provide some baseline expectations.
180. See, e.g., Jessica Holzer & Fawn Johnson, Larger Bounties Spur Surge
in Fraud Tips, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2010, at C3 (“[T]he guaranteed minimum
payout for whistle-blowers who qualify, [is] encouraging insiders to step
forward, said Erika Kelton of Phillips & Cohen LLP. ‘We’re seeing a flood of
inquiries,’ . . . .”).
181. See Barnard, supra note 177, at 412 (“The biggest objection to adoption
of an SEC bounty program, as was the case in 1988, will be that the
Enforcement Division already receives more tips than it can reasonably handle.”
(citations omitted)). Cf. Bruce Carton, Pitfalls Emerge in Dodd–Frank
Whistleblower Bounty Provision, SECURITIES DOCKET, Sept. 9, 2010, available at
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/09/09/pitfalls-emerge-in-dodd-frankwhistleblower-bounty-provision/ (“Contending with a barrage of borderline (or
worse) claims will prove quite costly to the SEC, which will still be required to
review each matter submitted to it.”).
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Further, increased transaction and compliance costs are sure
to inure to regulated entities, just as they have to companies to
which the FCA applies.182 One 1998 survey of government
contractors showed that in defending thirty-eight qui tam FCA
claims, the respondents expended over $53 million on outside legal
costs, whereas total recoveries only amounted to just over $3.5
million.183 Internal and other costs of defending such matters are
estimated to equal, if not exceed, those expended on legal fees.184
This data clearly indicates that the costs associated with
responding to such suits are substantial.
Although Dodd–Frank has no qui tam provision, and therefore
the number of actual cases instituted against regulated entities
should be lower, similar financial incentives for the whistleblower
are at play, and therefore a significant amount of non-meritorious
reporting is likely.185 While not all of these reports will lead to
trials, the costs of responding to any investigation launched by the
SEC is sure to be considerable.186 Due to this, non-meritorious
182. See Bucy, States, supra note 59, at 1532–33 (“FCA actions can also hurt
legitimate businesses. It is extremely costly for a company to respond to an FCA
action. . . . When a fraud investigation becomes public, business expansions,
corporate borrowing, and mergers and acquisitions may be put on hold or lost as
opportunities.”); Canni, supra note 94, at 12 (“These huge costs may ultimately
put the contractor out of business and result in a loss in jobs, cause the
contractor to raise his prices, or discourage future involvement with the
Government.”); Kovacic, supra note 167, at 225 (“[T]he survey data suggest that
contractors incur out-of-pocket legal costs of at least $250,000 to $500,000
whenever the firm is informed that the government has commenced an inquiry
into alleged []FCA violations or a qui tam relator has filed a suit.”).
183. See Kovacic, supra note 167, at 226 (“To defend themselves in these 38
completed matters, the survey respondents spent approximately $53,403,000 on
external legal costs. The total amount of CFCA recoveries obtained in these
matters was $3,694,484. The average expenditure in outside legal fees . . . was
$1,431,660, and the average CFCA recovery was $97,223.” (citations omitted)).
184. See id. at 225 (stating that “amounts paid to external professional
advisors quickly exceed $1 million and, in a number of cases, reach $10 million
or more” and that “the internal economic costs to the firm match or surpass the
costs associated with retaining external professional advisors such as law
firms”).
185. See supra notes 158–66 and accompanying text (referencing dismissal
rates of the FCA and predicting similar amounts of meritless reporting under
Dodd–Frank).
186. Cf. Bucy, States, supra note 59, at 1533 (reporting in the FCA context,
“When an investigation or lawsuit is nonmeritorious, the tangible and
intangible costs to the targeted company are not only substantial but also
unnecessary”). The article continues, “The threat of nonmeritorious actions,
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reporting should be disincentivized through an SEC rule holding
the whistleblower and government jointly liable to the regulated
entity for its reasonable attorney’s fees that are incurred in the
successful defense of any “related action” (as defined by the SEC
rules)187 that is found to be frivolous.188 This recommendation is
defined further infra Part IV.A.
C. State False Claims Acts
As Justice Brandeis so poignantly stated, “It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory.”189 Currently
twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the cities of
Chicago and New York, all have their own versions of the False
Claims Act.190 Many of these were passed in the wake of federal
legislation191 that provided states with an additional 10% of federal
Medicaid fraud recoveries.192 Each state’s version varies in
brought by any of thousands of potential relators, creates uncertainty for
businesses and often causes businesses to engage in unnecessarily extensive
and expensive preventative programs.” Id.
187. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–3(b)(1) (2011) (“A related action is a judicial or
administrative action that is brought by: (i) The Attorney General of the United
States; (ii) An appropriate regulatory authority; (iii) A self-regulatory
organization; or (iv) A state attorney general in a criminal case. . . .”).
188. See infra Part IV (describing further the proposed rule and definition of
“frivolous”).
189. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 386–87 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
190. See Taxpayers Against Fraud, State False Claims Acts,
http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (listing California,
Colorado Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin; some of
these are Medicaid only) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
191. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat 4 (2006).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(a) (2006) (“[I]f a State has in effect a law relating
to false or fraudulent claims . . . the Federal medical assistance percentage with
respect to any amounts recovered under a State action brought under such law,
shall be decreased by 10 percentage points.”); Bucy, States, supra note 59, at
1546 (“[H]aving a state qui tam statute will result in the federal government’s
decreasing the FMAP from fifty to forty percent for a Medicaid fraud settlement,
thereby increasing the state’s portion of the recovery to sixty percent of the
settlement or judgment . . . .”); Id. at 1535 (“Many of the state false claims
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different ways from the federal FCA;193 however, some of these
differences are of particular note here, as they reflect positive
evolutions applicable not only to the federal FCA, but also to the
Dodd–Frank whistleblower bounty program. Some of the systemic
changes not applicable to Dodd–Frank include changes such as
either removing private qui tam actions altogether194 or greatly
restricting them.195 Because Dodd–Frank does not provide a
private cause of action, the value, or lack thereof, of a qui tam
provision is of little moment here.
The most notable difference in many state FCAs is the
existence of an internal reporting requirement.196 These
requirements almost exclusively apply only to current or former
government employees who discovered the fraud during the course
of their employment.197 Typically these provisions require goodstatutes, however, are of very recent vintage. States have passed or significantly
amended ten of the twenty-four since 2005 when Congress provided a financial
incentive for states to pass FCAs that mirror the federal FCA.”).
193. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 15C.02(e) (2010) (“An employer is not liable for
an act committed by a nonmanagerial employee that violates this section, unless
the employer had knowledge of the act, ratified the act, or was reckless in the
hiring or supervision of the employee.”). No such similar exclusion exists under
the Federal FCA. See also Bucy, States, supra note 59, at 1536 (“Of the twentyfour states with qui tam statutes, fifteen statutes apply to any type of false
claim against the state, but the remaining nine statutes limit claims to health
care or Medicaid fraud.”).
194. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7504(b) (2011) (“[N]othing in this act
shall be construed to create a private cause of action.”).
195. See, e.g., Scachitti v. UBS Fin. Servs., 831 N.E.2d 544, 554 (Ill. 2005)
(interpreting the Illinois FCA and finding that only “the Attorney General has
the exclusive constitutional authority to represent the state,” thereby
eliminating standing for qui tam plaintiffs to bring claims on their own).
196. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-381.03 (2011) (“No present or former employee
of the District . . . may bring an action pursuant to subsection (b) of this
section . . . unless that employee first in good faith exhausted internal
procedures for reporting and seeking recovery of such falsely claimed
sums . . . .”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-27(e)(2) (2011) (“In no event may a person
bring an action under section 661-25: When the person is a present or former
employee of the State . . . unless the employee first, in good faith, exhausted any
existing internal procedures for reporting and seeking recovery of the falsely
claimed sums . . . .”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 357.090 (2010) (“No action may be
maintained pursuant to NRS 357.080 that is based upon information discovered
by a present or former employee of the State . . . unless he or she first in good
faith exhausted internal procedures for reporting and seeking recovery of the
proceeds of the fraudulent activity . . . .”).
197. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE 12652(d)(4) (West 2011) (“No court shall have
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faith exhaustion of all internal reporting procedures before the
government employee can file the qui tam suit.198 This type of
internal reporting requirement should be included in the Dodd–
Frank program. It would further reduce non-meritorious claims
and put the regulated entity on notice of possible securities
violations.199 Because an underlying value of Dodd–Frank is the
protection
of
whistleblower
anonymity,200
having
the
whistleblower’s attorney file the internal report on behalf of the
unnamed whistleblower could fulfill this internal reporting
requirement.201
A total exhaustion of internal channels is, in this author’s
opinion, too high a burden on putative whistleblowers. Simply
requiring that some sort of internal reporting has occurred,
however, would not be a substantial hurdle and would further the
larger public policy concerns of receiving the best quality,
meritorious tips from informants,202 while discouraging informants
with only specious information.203

jurisdiction over an action brought under subdivision (c) based upon information
discovered by a present or former employee of the state or a political subdivision
during the course of his or her employment . . . .”).
198. See e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-27(e)(2) (2011) (“In no event may a
person bring an action under section 661-25 . . . unless the employee first, in
good faith, exhausted any existing internal procedures for reporting and seeking
recovery of the falsely claimed sums . . . .”).
199. See infra Part III.D.3 (explaining how internal reporting would reduce
meritless claims by allowing employers to respond to them first).
200. See Dodd–Frank § 922(d)(1)(A) (“Any whistleblower who anonymously
makes a claim for an award under subsection (b) shall be represented by counsel
if the whistleblower anonymously submits the information upon which the claim
is based.”); Id. § 922(h)(2)(A) (“[T]he Commission and any officer or employee of
the Commission shall not disclose any information, including information
provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, which could reasonably be
expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower . . . .”).
201. See also infra Part III.D (discussing the internal reporting requirement
in the context of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act).
202. See SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70496 (“The Commission’s
primary goal, consistent with the congressional intent behind [Dodd–Frank], is
to encourage the submission of high-quality information to facilitate the
effectiveness and efficiency of the Commission’s enforcement program.”).
203. The internal reporting requirement is examined further infra Part
III.D and Part IV.C.
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Another extremely important recommendation from a state
FCA is drawn from the pre-2009 version of the Florida FCA.204
Under that version of the Act, if the government did not intervene
and the defendant was successful in defending against the suit,
then the “court shall award the defendant reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs against the person bringing the action.”205 This
provision would be an extreme deterrent to specious tips and
would greatly disincentivize non-meritorious reporting; an
analogous provision should be included in the Dodd–Frank
program. This recommendation is explored in further detail infra
Part IV.A.
The Minnesota FCA206 has a “right to cure”207 provision.208
This allows defendants to escape liability if they repay the amount
of actual damages within forty-five days of being informed of the

204. FLA. STAT. §§ 68.081–68.092 (2011) (establishing the Florida False
Claims Act).
205. FLA. STAT. § 68.086(3) (2008). This provision appears to have been
changed not because it was too effective or improperly administered, but rather
solely in order for the Florida FCA to become DRA compliant and therefore
qualify for the incentives noted supra note 192. See Bucy, States, supra note 59,
at 1531 (“Congress passed legislation in 2006 that offers financial rewards to
states that enact statutes patterned after the federal FCA.”). The article
continues:
If a state passes a false claim act that is ‘at least as effective in
rewarding and facilitating qui tam actions’ as the federal FCA, the
state receives a ten percent reduction in the amount it owes to the
federal government for the federal portion of any Medicaid fraud
recovery the state obtains. This provision went into effect on January
1, 2007.
Id. (citations omitted). Florida’s responses to Professor Bucy’s FCA
questionnaire note that the Florida FCA has been amended several times to
comply with the Federal FCA. See id. at 1565–66 (stating that the Florida FCA
provisions relating to the statute of limitations, penalty levels, and “[t]he time a
new filing is initially under seal,” were all “amended to conform with the
Federal Act,” and that the reason for the changes was “to comply with DRA”).
206. See MINN. STAT. §§ 15C.01–15C.16 (2011) (establishing the Minnesota
False Claims Act).
207. Marc Raspanti & Pamela Brecht, The Minnesota False Claims Act: Is It
Minnesota Nice?, 67 BENCH & B. MINN. 20, 21 (2010) (“Another significant
provision, which is not contained within the federal False Claims Act, is
Minnesota’s ‘Right to Cure’ provision.”).
208. See MINN. STAT. § 15C.02(f)(2) (2010) (“[A] person is not liable under
this section if . . . the person repays the amount of actual damages to the state
or the political subdivision within 45 days after being so informed.”).
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underlying violation.209 Although there is some logical appeal to
this kind of provision for Dodd–Frank, it is unlikely to work for
securities violations where the underlying damages would likely
inure to shareholders,210 thereby making expedient repayment
very difficult. Additionally, measuring the amount of “actual
damages” to those shareholders would be much more difficult than
is seen in the FCA context.211
Some municipalities have also adopted FCAs.212 One county in
Florida has certain “escape provisions”213 that allow defendants to
escape liability if they meet specified criteria, such as: “reasonably
209. Id.
210. See Complaint at 8, United States v. Madoff, 2009 WL 596981
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (NO. 09CR213) (alleging violations of “Title 17, Code of Federal
Regulations, Section 240.10b-5, by: (a) employing devices, schemes, and artifices
to defraud; (b) making untrue statements of material facts . . . .”). A 10b-5 action
makes it illegal to use “any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails” to defraud investors in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). This section has been interpreted to
provide a private right of action and is often used by shareholders to initiate
shareholder derivative suits. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31
(1964), abrogated on other grounds by Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61
(2001) (“It appears clear that private parties have a right under s 27 to bring
suit for violation of s 14(a) of the Act. . . [W]e believe that a right of action exists
as to both derivative and direct causes.”); see also e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 228 (1988) (“Respondents are former Basic shareholders . . . .
Respondents brought a class action against Basic and its directors, asserting
that the defendants issued three false or misleading public statements and
thereby were in violation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and of Rule 10b-5.”). See
generally Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule
10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008) (providing an overview of 10b-5
litigation).
211. See, e.g., Kevin McCoy, Few Madoff Victims Reimbursed as Many Await
Ruling on Claims, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2009, at 1B (“Court trustee Irving
Picard is seeking Madoff assets to repay victims. He’s collected $1.4 billion so
far, and has filed lawsuits seeking nearly $15 billion. But there are $19.4 billion
in estimated losses.” (emphasis added)).
212. See, e.g., supra note 190 and accompanying text (stating that Chicago
and New York City have False Claims Acts); MIAMI DADE COUNTY, FLA,
ORDINANCE, ch. 21, art. XV, §§ 21-255–21-266 (2012), available at
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=10620&stateId=9&stateName=
Florida (establishing a FCA for Miami-Dade County).
213. See Edward J. Kinberg, The Impact of Federal, State, and Local False
Claims Acts on the Construction Industry, 84 FLA. B. J. 48, 52 (Oct. 2010)
(“However, these ‘escape’ provisions also give MDC a very strong hammer to use
to discourage contractors from pursuing a claim.”).
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believing that such claim was free of any material misstatements,”
“no reasonable basis to doubt the truth, veracity, or accuracy of
such claim,” or the “claimant diligently investigated the facts
underlying such claim and prepared the claim in a reasonable
manner.”214 Defendants, however, only have five days to cure the
claim under any of these exceptions.215 These exceptions seem to be
addressing a common complaint amongst FCA critics regarding
over-enforcement, especially of technical violations.216 While this
issue could become a problem in the Dodd–Frank context, until the
program produces some empirical data, it is impossible to
prognosticate whether over-enforcement will be an issue.
Therefore, while some version of an “escape” provision may be
warranted in the future, it is not necessary at this point.217
214. MIAMI DADE COUNTY, FLA, ORDINANCE, ch. 21, art. XV, § 21-266(1)–(3)
(2012), available at http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=10620
&stateId=9&stateName=Florida.
215. See id. § 21-266(4) (“When information indicating that any
element . . . in the claim was false or misleading first became available, such
claimant, within five (5) business days of discovering the falsity of the claim,
took immediate steps to modify, correct, or withdraw such claim and
provided . . . immediate notice thereof.”).
216. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949
(1997) (“Qui tam relators are thus less likely than is the Government to forgo an
action arguably based on a mere technical noncompliance with reporting
requirements that involved no harm to the public fisc.”); Beck, supra note 91, at
630 (“From the informer’s perspective, however, it makes little difference
whether a particular case is a wise application of the False Claims Act. Any
reckless misstatement in a document submitted to the government might
generate a bounty, whether or not the defendant meant to defraud the public.”
(citations omitted)).
217. The over-enforcement/technical-violation critique seems to arise chiefly
in the qui tam context. See Kovacic, supra note 167, at 223 (“These passages
from Schumer implicitly recognize that qui tam oversight can elicit excessively
aggressive enforcement of certain legal commands. There may be numerous
instances in which compliance with a nominal legal command . . . may
undermine rather than enhance the public interest.”). Because Dodd–Frank
contains no qui tam provision, and enforcement will be left to the SEC, a good
faith “escape” provision may not ever be necessary. The lack of oversight by the
government that is consistently condemned in the FCA context should not be an
issue under Dodd–Frank because the SEC and other government actors are
completely responsible for litigating all actions under the program. See Rich,
supra note 121, at 1278 (“Much of the blame for these problems is put on
relators . . . . The problem instead lies with the DOJ, which is failing to
counterbalance the financial motivations of the relator with its own
considerations of how FCA actions can best serve the public interest.”); supra
notes 22–27, 37–45 and accompanying text (defining “covered actions” and
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D. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and Internal Reporting Requirements
1. Sarbanes–Oxley
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act218 (SOX) was passed in the wake of
the Enron and WorldCom scandals.219 It set out various provisions
requiring publically held companies to have independent directors,
audit committees, and numerous other changes to corporate
governance.220 Of particular relevance to this Note, one section also
addresses the whistleblower context.
Section 301(4) requires the “audit committees”221 of all
companies subject to SOX to establish procedures for “the receipt,
retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing
matters” and for the “confidential, anonymous submission by
employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable
accounting or auditing matters.”222 This provision was included to
decrease fraud through employee reporting or whistleblowing.223
“related actions” as used in Dodd–Frank).
218. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) [hereinafter Sarbanes–Oxley] (establishing increased disclosure and
accounting requirements for publically held companies).
219. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (“SOX was
enacted in a flurry of congressional activity in the runup to the midterm 2002
congressional elections after the spectacular failures of the once highly regarded
firms Enron and WorldCom.”).
220. See, e.g., id. at 1529, 1538 (stating, for example, “[s]ection 301 of SOX
requires all listed companies to have audit committees composed entirely of
independent directors, as defined by Congress” and “[s]ection 402(a) of SOX
prohibits corporations from arranging or extending credit to executive officers or
directors”).
221. The “audit committee” is defined by the statute as “a committee (or
equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of directors of an issuer
for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting processes of
the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer . . . .” Sarbanes–
Oxley § 2(a)(3) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201(3)(A) (2006)).
222. Sarbanes–Oxley § 301(4) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1
(2006)).
223. See Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud,
Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act for Employment
Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1056 (2004) (“One of the major purposes of
Sarbanes–Oxley is to promote the flow of accurate information to investors so
that they can make informed decisions about how to allocate their resources.
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The provision has led to the establishment of “whistleblower
hotlines,” where employees who become aware of fraud can report
it.224 The Act also provides substantial retaliation protections for
employees who report corporate malfeasance either internally to
the company or externally to government officials225 and makes it a
federal crime to retaliate against whistleblowers that report to law
enforcement.226
The requirement to institute such internal reporting
mechanisms is not phrased in discretionary terms; all companies
subject to SOX must institute them.227 In reaction to this federal
mandate and in order to avoid any possible liability and delisting,
companies instituted internal reporting mechanisms.228 The cost of
The whistleblowing provisions advance this purpose in that, if effective, they
will reduce the amount of fraudulent financial information.” (citations omitted)).
224. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Sarbanes–Oxley Whistleblower Hotlines
Across Europe: Directions Through the Maze, 42 INT’L LAW. 1, 1 (2008) (“One
discrete, and seemingly-straightforward, aspect of SOX and its Section 301
mandate [is] that audit committees offer ‘confidential, anonymous employee
complaint procedures,’ colloquially called whistleblower hotlines.”).
225. See Sarbanes–Oxley § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006))
(stating that no company shall “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or
in any other manner discriminate against an employee” for providing
information about violations of the securities laws to “a Federal regulatory or
law enforcement agency,” “any Member of Congress,” or “a person with
supervisory authority over the employee”); see also Cherry, supra note 223, at
1064 (“Under § 806 of Sarbanes–Oxley, whistleblowers who report instances of
fraud internally or to governmental agencies are statutorily protected from
retaliation if they work at publicly traded companies.”); id. at 1065 (“[T]he Act
protects whistleblowers who make internal reports of violations, as long as those
reports are made to a supervisor or another individual within the
organization. . . . Externally, the law covers reports to government agencies,
such as the SEC.”).
226. See Sarbanes–Oxley § 1107(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2006))
(stating that “[w]hoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate” takes any action
harmful to any person, including interference with employment, “for providing
to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the
commission” of any “Federal offense, shall be fined” or “imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both”).
227. See Sarbanes–Oxley § 301(4) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1
(2006)) (“Each audit committee shall establish procedures for—(A) the receipt,
retention, and treatment of complaints . . . .” (emphasis added)); Cherry, supra
note 223 at 1069 (“This is not phrased in discretionary terms—every publicly
traded company must have a system in place for receiving anonymous
complaints.”).
228. See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes–Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, 1139 (“The Act instructs
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complying with SOX is significant.229 In 2009, an SEC report found
that the average compliance cost for companies with a “public
float”230 of more than $75 million was $2.33 million per year.231 For
companies with a public float of less than $75 million, the average
was $690,000 per year.232 Granted, only a portion of these costs are
associated with the implementation and operation of the internal
reporting systems; however, it does represent some portion of those
totals, and the potential liability and other “soft” costs are
considerable as well.233 One observer noted that despite the
possible implications of Dodd–Frank on this SOX provision,
“companies will still have to keep compliance programs in place,
often at a significant cost.”234
the Securities and Exchange Commission to direct the national securities
exchanges and national securities associations (e.g., the New York Stock
Exchange . . . ) to prohibit the listing of any security of a company that is not in
compliance with th[e] [§ 301] requirement.”). It follows that because companies
remain listed on the New York Stock Exchange they must have complied with
section 301.
229. See OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY OF THE
SARBANES–OXLEY ACT OF 2002 SECTION 404 INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 4–5 (2009) [hereinafter SEC, REPORT], available at
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox-404_study.pdf (stating the mean compliance
costs for companies with a “public float” above $75 million was $2.33 million per
year).
230. See In re DVI Inc., Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 212 (E.D. Pa. 2008)
(“[P]ublic float, [is] defined as the percentage of a security held by the public as
opposed to company insiders . . . .”). Investorwords.com defines this term as,
“The portion of a company’s outstanding shares that is in the hands of public
investors, as opposed to company officers, directors, or controlling-interest
investors.” Public Float, INVESTORWORDS.COM, http://www.investorwords.com/
3936/public_float.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
231. SEC, REPORT, supra note 229, at 4–5.
232. Id. at 5.
233. See Kathy Gurchiek, Sarbanes–Oxley Compliance Costs Rising, HR
MAGAZINE, Jan. 2005, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3495/
is_1_50/ai_n8699080/ (“Dealing with whistle-blowers might not be the most
expensive element of complying with Sarbanes–Oxley. But it must be taken
seriously or the consequences could be costly . . . .”). The article continues,
“There also . . . are soft costs to the organization, such as potential loss of
business momentum and focus. The chief financial officer, for example, may be
less available for normal work duties because he or she is dealing with whistleblower-related activities.” Id.
234. Peter J. Henning, The S.E.C., Whistle-Blowers and Sarbanes–Oxley,
DEALBOOK.NYTIMES.COM (Nov. 9, 2010, 1:35 PM) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2010/11/09/the-s-e-c-whistleblowers-and-sarbanes-oxley/ (last visited Apr. 10,
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With these facts in mind, the SEC should promulgate a rule
for the Dodd–Frank program requiring all whistleblowers to first
file an internal report with their company before becoming eligible
for an award.235 It seems patently illogical to require all publically
held companies to institute internal reporting systems, at great
cost to the company, and then disincenitivize actual use of those
same systems through the Dodd–Frank program.236 Even the SEC
has stated that it wanted “to implement [Dodd–Frank] in a way
that encourages strong company compliance programs.”237 An
internal reporting requirement would effectuate that policy.238
Additionally, an internal reporting requirement would not be
inconsistent with other SEC programs. Under Section 10A of the
Exchange Act,239 when a registered public accounting firm,
performing an audit of a public company’s financial statements,
becomes aware of information that an illegal act “has or may have
occurred,” the accounting firm must first inform the company’s
audit committee.240 If the audit committee fails to take adequate
action, the accounting firm must then inform the board of
directors.241 Only if the board of directors then fails to report the
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
235. This recommendation is explored more fully infra Part IV.C.
236. Several of the comments received by the SEC to the proposed rules
advocated similar rules. See, e.g., BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, COMMENTS ON
PROPOSED RULES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS OF SECTION
21F OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 6 (2010) [hereinafter BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, COMMENTS], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-3310/s73310-142.pdf (recommending an “internal reporting [requirement] where a
company has a SOX-compliant procedure”). Business Roundtable consists of “an
association of chief executive officers of leading corporations with a combined
workforce of more than 12 million employees” and “nearly $6 trillion in annual
revenues.” Id. at 1. Several other comments made similar recommendations.
237. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70496.
238. See infra Part III.D.3 (explaining the policies underlying internal
reporting requirements and explaining why the existence of such a requirement
would lead to better company compliance).
239. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006)
(establishing an internal reporting requirement for registered public accounting
firms performing audits on publically held companies).
240. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B).
241. See id. § 78j-1(b)(2) (“If, after determining that the audit committee . . .
is adequately informed . . . the registered public accounting firm concludes
that . . . the senior management has not taken . . . timely and appropriate
remedial actions . . . the registered public accounting firm shall, as soon as
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violation to the SEC may the accounting firm report directly to the
SEC.242 Shareholder derivative suits echo a similar pattern of
internal reporting. In that context, the shareholder must first
make a demand of the board of directors that it pursue the claim or
justify why such a demand is excused before the shareholder can
pursue the action on his own.243
2. State Internal Reporting Requirements
Internal reporting requirements are also seen in a variety of
other state contexts, apart from those seen in the state FCAs.244
Ohio, for example, requires internal reporting to one’s employer of
violations of state or federal law as a prerequisite to reporting to
government officials and for successfully litigating a retaliation
claim.245 Similarly, Florida law requires the employee to first “in
writing, [bring] the activity, policy, or practice to the attention of a
supervisor” and afford “the employer a reasonable opportunity to
practicable, directly report its conclusions to the board of directors.”).
242. See id. § 78j-1(b)(3) (“An issuer whose board of directors receives a
report under paragraph (2) shall inform the Commission . . . . If the registered
public accounting firm fails to receive a copy of the notice [informing the
Commission] . . . the registered public accounting firm shall . . . furnish to the
Commission a copy of its report . . . .”).
243. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996), abrogated on
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (“A stockholder
filing a derivative suit must allege either that the board rejected his pre-suit
demand that the board assert the corporation’s claim or allege with particularity
why the stockholder was justified in not having made the effort to obtain board
action.”). For an overview of pre-suit demands, see generally Robert K. Wise,
Demand Futility in Shareholder-Derivative Litigation Under Texas Law, 28 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 59 (1997). Although shareholder derivative suits typically arise
under state law and therefore are not governed by the SEC, these suits often
relate to securities fraud or breaches of fiduciary duties by company directors
and therefore are applicable to the Dodd–Frank program.
244. See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text (describing State FCAs
with internal reporting/exhaustion requirements).
245. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52(A)(1)(A) (West 2011) (“[T]he
employee orally shall notify the employee’s supervisor or other responsible
officer of the employee’s employer of the violation and subsequently shall file
with that supervisor or officer a written report that provides sufficient detail to
identify and describe the violation.”); id. § 4113.52(D) (“If an employer takes any
disciplinary or retaliatory action against an employee as a result of the
employee’s having filed a report under division (A) of this section, the employee
may bring a civil action . . . .”).
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correct” the violation before retaliation protection attaches.246 New
York has a nearly identical law to Florida’s.247
Other states, in requiring internal reporting, carve out
exceptions that are applicable in the Dodd–Frank context. Maine
also withholds retaliation protection from reporting employees who
do not first bring the violation to the attention of their employer.248
Maine waives this exclusion, however, if “the employee has specific
reason to believe that reports to the employer will not result in
promptly correcting the violation.”249 New Jersey also has an
exclusion to its mandatory reporting law where “the employee is
reasonably certain that the activity, policy or practice is known to
one or more supervisors of the employer or where the employee
reasonably fears physical harm as a result of the disclosure
provided, however, that the situation is emergency in nature.”250
Alaska also requires internal reporting, but it is waived in four
situations: where the employee reasonably believes (1) reports to
the employer will not result in prompt action to remedy the
matter; (2) the activity, policy, or practice is already known to one
or more supervisors; (3) an emergency is involved; or (4) fears
reprisal or discrimination as a result of disclosure.251

246. FLA. STAT. § 448.102 (2011).
247. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 740(3) (McKinney 2011) (“The protection against
retaliatory personnel action . . . shall not apply to an employee who makes such
disclosure . . . unless the employee has brought the activity, policy or
practice . . . to the attention of a supervisor of the employer and has afforded
such employer a reasonable opportunity to correct . . . .”); see also DANIEL P.
WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE 69–70 (2d ed. 2004) (listing, in addition to the above, Arkansas,
Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Wyoming, Colorado, and North Carolina as all
requiring either prior internal reporting or notice to the employer before
external reporting is permitted).
248. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 833(2) (2011) (“Subsection 1 does not apply
to an employee who has reported . . . unless the employee has first brought the
alleged violation, condition or practice to the attention of a person having
supervisory authority . . . and has allowed the employer a reasonable
opportunity to correct that violation . . . .”).
249. Id.
250. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (2011) (“The protection against retaliatory
action provided by this act pertaining to disclosure to a public body shall not
apply to an employee who makes a disclosure . . . unless the employee has
brought the activity . . . to the attention of a supervisor . . . .”).
251. ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.110(c) (2011).
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Clearly the experience of the states supports prior internal
reporting. These provisions are even harsher than would be
applicable in Dodd–Frank, as they prevent employees from
qualifying for retaliation protections,252 whereas the internal
reporting requirement advocated here would simply prevent the
whistleblower from collecting a bounty.253
3. Public Policies Supporting Internal Reporting
Chiefly, an internal reporting requirement would support the
main public policies which underlie any whistleblowing system on
the macro level. First and foremost, the primary goal of any
whistleblower provision should not be the punishment or
harassment of employers by whistleblowers with intrinsic conflicts
of interest,254 but rather it should be the fast and effective
correction of any wrongdoing.255 This sentiment is reflected in a
host of scholarship. One pair of scholars noted: “[T]he primary goal
of whistleblowing is reduc[ing] wrongdoing rather than the
prosecution of wrongdoers, and the speed with which problems are
addressed is significant.”256
252. See supra notes 245–51 and accompanying text (describing state laws).
253. See infra Part IV.C (describing further the internal reporting
requirement).
254. See supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text (discussing the
whistleblowers’ inherent conflicts of interest).
255. See Terry Dworkin & Elletta Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing:
Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM.
BUS. L.J. 267, 285 (1991) (“Although prosecution may be a legitimate secondary
goal of public whistleblower protection, it should not be permitted to hamper the
primary objective of most whistleblowing statutes, which is to correct the
wrongdoing as quickly and efficiently as possible.”).
256. Id. at 306. Cf. Larry DiMatteo & Don Wiesner, Academic Honor Codes:
A Legal and Ethical Analysis, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 49, 83 (1994) (“[T]he primary goal
of whistleblowing [or reporting honor code violations] is reduction of wrongdoing
rather than the prosecution of wrongdoers . . . . Thus, if the violation can be
prevented or the violator immediately confronted, then it is more likely that the
harm to the individuals and to the institution will be minimized.” (citations
omitted) (citing Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 255, at 306)); Raxak Mahat, A
Carrot for the Lawyer: Providing Economic Incentives for In-House Lawyers in a
Sarbanes–Oxley Regime, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 932–33 (2008) (“The
primary goal should be to get the information out at the earliest possible time so
that transaction costs and shareholder losses are minimized and market
confidence is not unnecessarily undermined.”); Sarah Baum, Note, Callahan v.
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An internal reporting requirement would support this goal in
a variety of ways. Internal reporting would allow the company to
respond quickly to allegations that are the result of simple
negligence,
oversight,
“some
other
easily
corrected
inadvertence,”257 or situations of legal nuance.258 In many cases
upper management may not even be aware of the issues being
reported.259 Internal reporting would allow companies to correct
their own mistakes and avoid the need for significant, extended,
and costly government intervention.260 In the Dodd–Frank context,
Edgewater Care & Rehabilitation Center: The Illinois Whistleblower Act Does
Not Preempt the Common Law Tort of Retaliatory Discharge, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
161, 186–87 (2007) (“The primary goal of state whistleblower statutes is to
correct wrongdoing.”); Trystan Phifer O’Leary, Note, Silencing the
Whistleblower: The Gap Between Federal and State Retaliatory Discharge Laws,
85 IOWA L. REV. 663, 663–64 (2000) (“The primary goal of many federal statutes,
therefore, is not protection of the whistleblower. Rather, provisions protective of
whistleblowers were included primarily as tools by which to advance the
objectives of the legislation.” (citations omitted)).
257. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 247, at 39–40 (“[E]mployees
should consider . . . whether improprieties simply were the result of negligence,
oversight, mistake, or some other easily corrected inadvertence.”).
258. See Moberly, supra note 228, at 1156 (“[R]eporting errors could occur
simply because an employee does not fully understand an ambiguous and
complex situation in which it might be difficult to discern legal from illegal
conduct.”); see also Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1760 (2007) (“Internal whistleblowing also enables the
correction of misunderstanding, which reduces the likelihood that the
organization and its employees will unfairly suffer harm.”); Kevin Runinstein,
Note, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes–Oxley Section 806: Balancing the
Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 650 (2008) (“In
a case where no actual wrongdoing occurred, internal whistleblowing would
allow the employer to clarify the misunderstanding before negative information
becomes public.”).
259. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 247, at 40 (“Attempts to
informally resolve alleged violations may lead to correction of problems, and
may prevent criminal prosecution of honest but ill-informed managers who
would immediately correct problems if they knew about them.”); Terry Dworkin
& Janet Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J.
241, 243 (1987) (“[T]op executives may actually be unaware of wrongdoing
committed by subordinates; internal complaints give them a chance to stop the
wrongdoing before it is made public.”).
260. See Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d
474, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Employees should not be discouraged from the
normal route of pursuing internal remedies before going public . . . . [I]t is most
appropriate, both in terms of efficiency and economics . . . that employees notify
management of their observations as to the corporation’s failures before formal
investigations and litigation are initiated . . . .”); David Culp, Whistleblowers:
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this benefit would actually inure to the public, as immediate public
disclosure would likely lead to significant negative press, thereby
harming public shareholders through lowered share values.261
Further, the requirement would also incentivize companies to
create effective reporting and compliance mechanisms, as only
where responsive and efficient systems are in place would the
requirement preclude full public disclosure of the possible
violation.262

Corporate Anarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 109, 133 (1995) (“This would ‘give employers the initial opportunity to
correct their own violations,’ and encourage resolution within the company.”
(quoting Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory
Discharge, 16 MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 277, 305 (1982))).
261. For a detailed discussion of how all publically available information
integrates into stock price, see generally Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554 (1984) (“The
common definition of market efficiency, that ‘prices at any time ‘fully reflect’ all
available information’ . . . .” (quoting Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970))); see also
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (“There are three
versions of the efficient capital market hypothesis: weak, semi-strong, and
strong.”) The court continues:
The weak version is that prices incorporate information in a way that
prevents the historical pattern of prices from being used to predict
changes in price. In other words, it is not possible to identify any
trading rule that beats the market. Everyone can observe historical
prices; if information were there, sophisticated traders would use it,
prices would adjust, and the past prices would cease to be
informative. This implies that only someone with new information
can make a trading profit. The semi-strong version adds that the
value of new information is itself reflected in prices quickly after
release, so that only the first recipient of this information (or someone
with inside information) makes a profit; everyone else might as well
ignore the information and rely on the prices. The strong version adds
a claim that the price set in this way is right, in the sense that it
accurately reflects the firm’s value.
Id. at 685.
262. See Runinstein, supra note 258, at 652 (“Requiring internal disclosure
as a first resort would also encourage organizations to develop effective
reporting and compliance mechanisms to ensure that problems are corrected
within the organization in order to avoid external disclosure.”); cf. Dworkin &
Near, supra note 259, at 251 (“[T]he provisions encourage organizations to set
up grievance procedures or other constructive ways of dealing with internal
problems, for the bar to suit by employees exists only for those who do not make
reasonable efforts to take advantage of what is available.”).
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Reducing costs for all parties involved should also underlie
any good whistleblower program.263 As explained above, the
internal reporting requirement would screen out spurious claims,
saving both the government (in the form of reduced investigative
expenditures) and companies money. Whistleblowers may also use
external reporting for bad-faith purposes, such as gaining an
advantage in promotions or retaliating against the employer for
some perceived slight.264 An internal reporting requirement would
channel these complaints inward where they could be vetted more
cheaply than by government investigation and avoid possible
litigation and opportunity costs.265
The SEC has expressed reticence in promulgating an internal
reporting requirement, stating, “[W]hile many employers have
compliance processes that are well-documented, thorough, and
robust, and offer whistleblowers appropriate assurances of
confidentiality, others lack such established procedures and
protections.”266 An internal reporting requirement, however, would
actually incentivize the establishment and use of such robust and
thorough procedures.267 Companies subject to SOX are already
mandated to have in place substantial internal reporting
mechanisms,268 and any lack of internal systems would in no way
263. See Moberly, supra note 228, at 1153 (describing the costs associated
with any whistleblower system, and finding that the SOX model of internal
reporting “minimizes those costs and, where appropriate, reduces the costs of
whistleblowing”).
264. See id. at 1156 (“Whistleblowers could use the system opportunistically
to gain some sort of job security by disclosing imaginary misconduct, to achieve
an advantage in promotion or salary by wrongly reporting a co-employee, or
simply to hurt the employer in retaliation for some perceived slight.” (citations
omitted)).
265. See id. (“[T]he costs of such erroneous claims include costs associated
with internal investigations, litigation expenses, opportunity costs, potential
penalties, and costs related to becoming a possible target for government
regulators.”). The article continues, “The [SOX] Model can reduce the costs of
whistleblowing errors, whether made maliciously or in good faith, because the
Model channels whistleblower disclosures internally rather than externally. . . .
[A] corporation that receives erroneous disclosures internally at least has the
possibility of providing feedback and correct information to a whistleblowing
employee.” Id. at 1156–57 (citations omitted).
266. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70496.
267. See supra note 262 and accompanying text (describing how the
requirement would lead to effective internal reporting systems).
268. See Sarbanes–Oxley § 301(4) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1
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preclude subsequent external reporting to the SEC by the
whistleblower if the company fails to do so. Finally, the SEC’s
concern about confidentiality could easily be remedied by having
the whistleblower’s attorney file the internal report. Dodd–Frank
itself requires anonymous whistleblowers to be represented by
counsel.269
While the SEC notes that it “does not intend for its rules to
undermine effective company processes for receiving reports on
potential violations,”270 the tremendous economic incentives
provided for under the Dodd–Frank program do just that.271 The
best way to ensure “thorough and robust”272 internal reporting
systems is by not just allowing internal reporting but by requiring
it.
With all this in mind, a uniform rule would include a
requirement that, for any whistleblower to become eligible for an
award under Dodd–Frank, the whistleblower must first have filed
an internal report and given the company a reasonable time to
respond.273 The whistleblower’s counsel can fulfill this requirement
if adequate confidential reporting systems are not in place. The
(2006)) (“Each audit committee shall establish procedures for—(A) the receipt,
retention, and treatment of complaints . . . .” (emphasis added)); Cherry, supra
note 223, at 1069 (“This is not phrased in discretionary terms—every publicly
traded company must have a system in place for receiving anonymous
complaints.”).
269. See Dodd–Frank § 922(d)(2) (“Any whistleblower who anonymously
makes a claim for an award under subsection (b) shall be represented by counsel
if the whistleblower anonymously submits the information upon which the
claims is based.”).
270. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70496.
271. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, COMMENTS, supra note 236, at 2 (“[D]espite
the Commission’s best intentions, its ‘Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protection’ program is likely to significantly undermine established corporate
compliance programs by giving employees a substantial financial incentive and
no meaningful disincentive to bypass internal reporting mechanisms in pursuit
of bounty payments from the SEC.”).
272. Id.
273. Nothing in this requirement should be interpreted as removing
retaliation protection under Dodd–Frank from the putative whistleblower. See
Dodd–Frank § 922(h)(1)(A) (“No employer may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, [or] harass . . . a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower—(i) in
providing information to the Commission . . . .”). This suggestion only relates to
removing the bounty incentive from whistleblowers that fail to file an internal
report.
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internal reporting requirement would be waived if the employee:
(1) is reasonably certain that the employer will not make a good
faith effort at remedying the violation, such as where the conduct
implicates high-level supervisors (such as directors), or
(2) reasonably believes an emergency is involved.274
This recommendation would both further the policy goals
underlying whistleblower provisions and reduce meritless reporting
to the SEC by having the companies themselves screen spurious or
ill-informed claims.275 In addition, this recommendation balances
the interests of both whistleblowers and companies by requiring a
presumptive duty to file an internal report but also recognizing that
in certain circumstances such a barrier may be too high.276
IV. Recommendations
A synthesis of all this information leads to a few logical
conclusions. Experience under the IRS whistleblower bounty
274. These exceptions are fairly similar to those seen above, supra note 250,
in the New Jersey statute, about which one commentator stated, “The
requirement gives employees the opportunity to voice any concerns they may
have with their employers candidly and in good faith. It also gives employers the
opportunity to inform employees about any potential misperception the
employee has made about the relevant law or actual practice.” David Aron,
“Internal” Business Practices?: The Limits of Whistleblower Protection for
Employees Who Oppose or Expose Fraud in the Private Sector, 25 ABA J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 277, 295–96 (2010).
275. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (describing how internal
reporting would lead to internal resolution of many disputes).
276. Some comments to the proposed rules made similar suggestions,
including the exceptions to the duty. See, e.g., HUNTSMAN CORPORATION,
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE WHISTLEBLOWER
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 21F OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 5 (2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/whistleblower/whistleblow
er-74.pdf (“We strongly urge that the SEC impose upon a whistleblower a
presumptive duty to report a potential violation to the company . . . .”). The
comment continues:
We recognize that there may be instances in which a whistleblower
may not want to report to the company because of a concern that
there will be retaliation or that senior management is . . . involved in
the wrongdoing . . . . Thus, we suggest that the SEC . . . leave open
the possibility that a whistleblower may be allowed to circumvent the
company’s compliance process if there is a substantial, reasonable
and legitimate reason to do so.
Id. at n.1.
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provision shows that reporting under Dodd–Frank is likely to
increase markedly from that seen under the old § 78u program and
is also likely to increase over time.277 In fact, David Rosenfeld,
associate director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office, stated
that his office has been “inundated” with tips and complaints
under the newly enacted program.278 He expects “tons of these
whistleblower complaints” and that “considerable resources and
time” will be needed to sort out viable tips.279 This only reinforces
the inference drawn from the IRS program’s reporting data that a
major amount of reporting under Dodd–Frank should be
expected.280 The IRS data also show that a major increase in
collected penalties and payouts of bounties is imminent as well.281
A. Reverse Attorney’s Fees
Federal experience with the FCA illustrates that an extreme
amount of meritless reporting should be expected.282 To combat
this problem the SEC should promulgate rules disincentivizing
meritless reporting under Dodd–Frank. Drawing on both federal
and state FCA provisions,283 such a rule should state: Where the
defendant is successful in defending a suit brought against it
pursuant to information provided by a Dodd–Frank whistleblower,
the government and the whistleblower shall be jointly and
277. See supra Part III.A (describing the IRS program and data).
278. Yin Wilczek, SEC to Take Advantage of New Powers to File Aiding,
Abetting Charges, Official Says, 8 CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (BNA) 1224 (Nov.
12, 2010).
279. Id.
280. See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text (predicting significant
reporting under Dodd–Frank).
281. See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text (describing collection and
payment data).
282. See supra notes 149–66 and accompanying text (describing meritless
claims data).
283. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (2006) (“[T]he court may award to the
defendant its reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses if the defendant prevails
in the action and the court finds that the claim of the person bringing the action
was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of
harassment.”); FLA. STAT. § 68.086(3) (2008) (“If the department does not proceed
with an action under this act and the defendant is the prevailing party, the
court shall award the defendant reasonable attorney’s fees and costs against the
person bringing the action.”).
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severally liable to the defendant for the costs of its reasonable
attorney’s fees, if the suit is shown to have been frivolous.
As noted in Part III.B, the “clearly frivolous” language of the
federal FCA has been interpreted too narrowly in this context,284
and thus this recommendation refers to the definition of “frivolous”
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11.285 Using the Rule
11 definition of “frivolous” provides a prepackaged standard with
which lawyers and judges are both well aware and familiar.286
B. Nurturing Unlawful Conduct
Experience with the federal FCA also cautions that “nurturing
unlawful conduct” will be an issue in the Dodd–Frank context as
well.287 This phenomenon involves the incentive that
whistleblowers in the bounty context have to delay reporting until

284. See, e.g., Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1006–07 (9th Cir.
2002) (“The award of fees under the False Claims Act is reserved for rare and
special circumstances.”).
285. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (establishing the effect of an attorney or
unrepresented party’s signing of pleadings, motions, other papers, and
representations to the court, and providing sanctions for frivolous assertions
contained therein). The Rule states:
[A]n attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for
any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and
other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing
law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions
are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are
reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
Id.
286. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1013, 1013 (1988) (“Rule 11 has become a significant factor in civil
litigation . . . .”). “[T]he majority of the lawyers practicing in federal courts must
be aware by now of the requirements of rule 11. This awareness has certainly
deterred some frivolous, wasteful, or abusive litigation.” Id. at 1014–15.
287. See supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text (describing the concept
of “nurturing unlawful conduct” in the FCA context).
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damages have increased to the maximum amount.288 Because the
whistleblowers’ compensation is tied directly to the amount of
damages, the higher the damages, the greater their award.289
To combat this, the SEC should promulgate a rule that
reduces the whistleblowers award to the minimum percentage
allowed by law if it is found that the whistleblower unreasonably
delayed reporting the violation. Under the FCA, Congress has
found it fit to cap the relator’s award at 10% if their claim was
based on certain publically available information.290 The only
award amounts that are appealable under Dodd–Frank, however,
are those outside the 10%–30% range.291 Therefore, it seems
unlikely that the SEC has the statutory authority to reduce the
award below 10% for this kind of conduct. A congressional
amendment to the program authorizing an award below the 10%
minimum for unreasonably delaying whistleblowers should occur
as well.
C. Internal Reporting Requirement
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the realities of SOX
and the experience of the states in the FCA and employment
288. Supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text.
289. Supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text.
290. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2006) (reducing the award to maximum of 10%).
The text of the statute states:
Where the action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on
disclosures of specific information (other than information provided
by the person bringing the action) relating to allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office
report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the
court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no
case more than 10 percent of the proceeds . . . .
Id.
291. See SEC, Final Rules, supra note 35, at 34347 (“[W]hen the
Commission makes an award between 10 and 30 percent . . . our final order
regarding the amount of an award (including the award allocation among
multiple whistleblowers) is not appealable.”); Dodd–Frank § 922(f) (“Any such
determination, except the determination of the amount of an award if the award
was made in accordance with subsection (b), may be appealed to the appropriate
court of appeals of the United States. . . .”); supra notes 34–36 and
accompanying text (describing the right of appeal).
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retaliation contexts demonstrate that the SEC should promulgate
an internal reporting requirement.292 This rule would require a
presumptive duty for the whistleblower to report internally first
and then allow a reasonable amount of time for the company to
respond. The whistleblower’s counsel can fulfill this requirement if
the company does not have adequate, confidential systems in
place. The internal reporting presumption can be overcome in two
situations, if the employee: (1) is reasonably certain that the
employer will not make a good-faith effort at remedying the
violation, such as where the conduct implicates high-level
supervisors (such as directors), or (2) reasonably believes an
emergency is involved.
V. Conclusion
By recognizing the inherent conflict in using a “rogue to catch
a rogue,” this Note concludes that certain changes to the Dodd–
Frank whistleblower bounty program are necessary. Data
compiled from the IRS and the Federal False Claims Act illustrate
that a significant amount of meritless reporting is expected. To
combat this, a reverse attorney’s fees rule is needed. Experience
with the Federal FCA also illustrates that a major reduction in
awards should occur for all whistleblowers that unreasonably
delay reporting. Drawing on State False Claims Acts and the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, an internal reporting rule is necessary to
reduce further the transaction costs associated with meritless or
otherwise unnecessary reporting. In sum, when using rogues to
catch rogues, it is both necessary and appropriate to confine these
whistleblowers somewhat so as to provide a check against the
enormous economic incentive provided by whistleblower bounty
programs.

292. See supra notes 218–76 and accompanying text (describing the
requirements of SOX); supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text (discussing
state FCA provisions with internal reporting requirements); supra notes 245–52
(describing internal reporting requirements in state employment retaliation
law).

